Mawasheviche Nexus: NATO Eastern Frank, Russian Hybrid War, Reorganization of Eurasian Logistics

Created: September 16, 2025

Reporting period: January 1, 2025 – September 15, 2025 (including past contexts if necessary)

Executive Briefs (Summary: 1 page)

• 結論: Poland's continued blockade of the Belarusian border is not a temporary or unilateral measure, but is part of a legally codified and militarily strengthened NATO/EU integration strategy to contain Russian invasions and their hybrid manifestations. This has caused a structural and irreversible shift from the northern route in logistics between China and Europe, and China has realistically adapted to this change despite diplomatic protests.

• Argument: The border closure is rooted in a series of EU sanctions packages targeting Belarus on citing complications in the Ukrainian war and human rights violations, particularly provisions restricting road transport. The measure is reinforced by Polish national law that legally defines the "instrumentalization" of immigration as a hybrid threat and allows special border measures. The drone invasion incident in September 2025, followed by the NATO Article 4 consultations and military expansion forces, NATO's unified resolve, solidifying the "hardened" state of the border. At the same time, logistics data shows a clear shift, with overall rail transport volume dropping, but shippers avoiding the risk of politically unstable northern routes almost double the TEU (20-foot container equivalent unit) transport volume in the intermediate corridor has been increased.

• meaning: For commercial entities, reliance on the north route via Poland is now a high-risk strategy, with supply chains having to be re-aligned to intermediate corridors or maritime transport, accepting new cost and time-of-ship standards. The challenge for NATO and the EU is to solidify the resilience of the frontline states against sustained Russian hybrid attacks, while managing the secondary economic impacts of this security posture. For Russia and China, the border closure shows the West's ability to impose sustained and serious economic friction against security threats, and forces both countries to restructure their own strategic initiatives at a cost.

Chapter 1: Institutionalized frontiers: Poland's border policy as an integrated NATO/EU strategy (examination of hypothesis H1)

1.1 Legal foundation: EU sanctions

Poland's border closure measures are not just a makeshift response, but a direct implementation of a multi-layered EU legal framework. This evolution of the legal framework has been stepped up from sanctions targeting specific individuals since 2004 to broad sectoral regulations following the participation of Belarus in the 2020 election fraud, the 2021 Ryan Air aircraft hijacking incident, and the 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

Critical importance is certain provisions in EU Council Regulation (EC) No 765/2006 and subsequent amendments (including the 16th sanctions package in February 2025). These clauses explicitly prohibit road transport operators established in Belarus from operating within the EU, including transits. This is the direct legal authority to block borders over commercial cargo. Furthermore, the June 2024 sanctions package has a clear purpose to match the content with sanctions against Russia to prevent sanctions evasion, indicating the strategic intention of the EU to treat Belarus and Russia as a single economic security bloc in sanctions.

1.2 Domestic Legislation: Poland's Legal Framework for Hybrid Wars

In addition to EU-level regulations, Poland has also put the concept of "hybrid threat" into domestic law. The revision of the Foreigners Protection Act in February 2025 was groundbreaking in that it introduced the legal concept of "instrumentalisation" of immigration.

The definition of "instrumentalization" in this Act includes "actions by a country adjacent to Poland... that allow foreigners to cross foreign borders in violation of the law" and "the use of violence (against border patrol personnel)." This granted the Polish Border Patrol the legal authority to take special measures, such as temporarily suspending asylum applications at the border, as was implemented on March 27, 2025. Furthermore, the broader "Fatherland Defense Act" and the Presidential Strategic Act for Responding to External Threats aim to create an integrated system to counter sub-threshold and hybrid attacks, indicating an integrated government approach.

1.3 Law and Operational Feedback Loop

The relationship between EU sanctions and Polish domestic law is not merely hierarchical, but rather a symbiotic relationship that influences each other. Poland's experience at the forefront of the hybrid attack of weaponizing immigrants has actively shaped the evolution of EU policies and legal systems.

This process unfolds as follows: First, Belarus launched the immigration crisis in 2021 as a "hybrid attack." In response, major targets, Poland, Lithuania and Latvia responded with emergency measures such as pushing back illegal immigrants and building border fences. These frontline states, particularly Poland, have then proposed a stronger legal framework within the EU to counter this particular threat. A specific example of this was the June 2024 "Cooperative Initiative on EU-Level Approach to Effectively Addressing the Instrumentation of Migration," which called for the possibility of deviations from standard EU asylum laws on the grounds of national security.

In response, the EU expanded its listing standards in November 2021 to clearly sanction groups involved in the instrumentalization of immigration. In parallel, Poland codified this concept into its own domestic law, aligning with the evolving EU framework and constructing a robust domestic legal shield that is justified. This shows that Poland is not only a passive implementer of EU policy, but also an active formation who drives security in immigration issues at the EU level. This institutional hardening is extremely unlikely to lift the border closure unless there is a fundamental change in Belarus' attitude. This is because it requires overturning both EU regulations and Poland's national security law. This strongly supports hypothesis H1.

Chapter 2: Asymmetric Battlefields: Russian Hybrid Attempts and NATO's Computed Response (Finding Hypothesis H2)

2.1 Hybrid Pressure Campaign: Attacks from multiple perspectives

The sustainable, low-level hybrid campaign orchestrated by Belarus and Russia is unfolding in multiple vectors. At the heart of this is the weaponization of immigrants, and according to statistical data, there were 110,595 attempts to cross the border between July 2021 and November 2024, and 2,227 attempts in January to March 2025 alone. These cross-border attempts are of a violent nature, with impromptu weapons attacks on the Polish security forces and destructive activities of border infrastructure.

This campaign is more than just an issue of immigration. Other attack vectors have also been identified, including sabotage, diversionary action, cyberattacks, and extensive disinformation activities aimed at instigate divisions within Poland and the EU.

2.2 Case Study: Drone Invasion Case in September 2025

The most recent escalation was the September 2025 drone invasion. In the incident, 19 Russian drones violated Polish airspace for over seven hours. According to Polish Foreign Minister Sikorski and NATO's assessment, the invasion was not accidental, but rather a planned one intended to test NATO's response capabilities. The fact that the invading drones were "duds" without explosives suggests that this was a provocative "trial" calculated to fall below the threshold for open military attacks.

Immediate and multi-layered responses to this included the launch of Polish military and allies' air defense systems (such as the Dutch F-35 and Italian AWACS), neutralising the threat and temporary closure of Warsaw Airport airspace.

2.3 NATO response: From consultation to increased

NATO's organizational response began when Poland officially invoked Article 4 of the Washington Convention and requested consultations within the North Atlantic Council (NAC). After these discussions, concrete military expansion was promised and unfolded under a new framework called the "Operation Eastern Sentinel."

• Netherlands: Air defense systems, firearms, 300-person squadrons

• Czech Republic: Helicopter, 100 soldiers

• Denmark: Two F-16 fighter jets, one anti-aircraft combat frigate

• France: 3 Rafale fighter jets

• Germany: 4 Eurofighters

• Poland: As a countermeasure against the joint Russian-Belarus military exercise "Zapad 2025" held at the same time, the country's border deployment forces four times to 40,000

These increase augments will reinforce existing NATO presence, such as the US-led eFP (enhanced forward presence) combat group stationed in Orziz/Bemobo Pisque (comprising US, UK, Croatian and Romanian forces), and the ongoing Baltic Air Policing missions, which Poland regularly participates.

2.4 Practice of the "Trip Wire and Reinforcements" Doctrine

The events of September 2025 were not panic reactions, but rather examples of the deterrent posture that NATO had evolved in Touhou Frank in real life. This showed that permanent eFP combat groups and air security missions act as "trip wires" and that the Article 4 consultation process serves as a political and military mechanism to invoke pre-planned, expandable reinforcement packages.

The chain of this process is as follows: First, Russia will carry out provocative acts (a group of unarmed drones) that do not lead to the invocation of Article 5. Next, "tripwire" troops on the field (eFP and air security forces) detect and respond to immediate threats, demonstrating their early capabilities and determination. A threatened alliance (Poland) invokes Article 4, which acts as the official "switch" in the system. This will internationalize the cases and encourage collective decisions across the alliance. The North Atlantic Council will be convened to demonstrate political solidarity and approve the next stage of the response. Finally, a "reinforcement" phase is invoked, where multiple allies deploy pre-designated troop packages (Operation Eastern Sentinel) in specific areas where threats occur, visibly strengthening deterrence and increasing costs for opponents to further escalate.

This sequence not only supports the hypothesis H2 that Russia prefers asymmetric behavior, but also illustrates NATO's strategy to counter it. The Alliance has a playbook that connects tactical responses in the "gray zone" with strategic reinforcements, making it difficult for Russia to achieve its "test NATO" objective without paying the strategic price of a larger, more capable NATO presence at the border.

Table 1: Hybrid Pressure Index: Incidents at the Polish-Belarusian Border (Monthly, 2025)

Chapter 3: Strategic Route Changes in China: Geoeconomics at the Eurasian Landbridge (test of Hypothesis H3)

3.1 Decline of the Northern Route: Bottlenecks and Political Risks

The Central European Squadron has previously expanded its transport volume with the Mawa-Sheviche-Brest Border Crossing as its main gateway to the EU. However, as 2025 began, the situation changed completely. Total railway container transport volume has declined by approximately 22% in the first half of the year, showing a sharp decline. The decline is the intensifying competition from declining maritime freight rates, as well as the physical and political bottlenecks created by Poland's border closure. The already delayed plan for the Dry Port expansion in Mawasheviche is losing its significance due to changes in geopolitical circumstances.

3.2 The rise of the intermediate corridor: a structural shift

In contrast to the overall decline in transport volume, the "intermediate corridor" (TITR, International Transport Route across the Caspian Sea) has seen dramatic growth. Data shows that while the north routes via Russia and Belarus fell 26%, mid-corridor transport nearly doubled in the first half of 2025 (from 19,370 TEU to 40,200 TEU), the data show. This shows a clear alternative effect.

The middle corridor still has challenges. Compared to the northern route (12-18 days), it is longer transport time (18-23 days), and it is expensive, and logistics are complicated, such as crossing multiple borders and re-shipment over the sea in the Caspian Sea. However, for many shippers, geopolitical risk aversion is a factor that outweighs pure economic rationality. The intermediate corridor is now recognized as "a politically secure route that guarantees supply chain integrity."

3.3 China's dual response: realistic adaptation and diplomatic pressure

The Chinese government's response is dual. On the other hand, Chinese state-owned enterprises and logistics companies are actively developing new services for the intermediate corridor that travel from Guangzhou, Chongqing and Chengdu to Europe via Turkey and Romania. This is evidence of practical acceptance of new reality.

China, on the other hand, is experiencing diplomatic pressure. The official statement from China's Foreign Ministry regarding the border closure was cautiously dictated, hoping to "safe and smooth operation of rail transport" and stability in its supply chain, whilst avoiding directly criticizing Poland. This sends a political signal to the EU that border closures come with costs, which China could use as a bargaining material in other diplomatic fields. Foreign Minister Wang Yi's visit to Warsaw shortly after the drone crisis and border closure is attracting attention as an important diplomatic move.

3.4 BRI diversification unintentionally encourages border closures

Poland's security-motivated border closures are unintentionally accelerating the "diversification of routes," one of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)'s long-term goals. While causing disruption to the main corridors, this situation forces the revitalization and maturation of secondary intermediate corridors, resulting in the entire BRI network becoming more resilient to Russian political risks.

This dynamic works in the following way: Initially, BRI relied heavily on fast and efficient northern routes through Russia, Belarus and Poland, which created a single point of failure. The Ukrainian War exposed the political vulnerability of this route and raised interest in the intermediary corridor. And the Polish border closure, a direct result of the Russian-Belarus hybrid war, has transformed the northern route from "fragile" to "unreliable." This strong impact on the market has forced shippers and logistics companies to move from simply "considering" the intermediate corridor to a stage where they are actively "committing" despite costs and complexity. This is evidence of double the amount of TEU transport.

China has expressed its diplomatic dissatisfaction with the turmoil, but is strategically profiting. Forced investment and increased transport volume in the intermediate corridor will increase its capabilities and efficiency at a much faster pace than natural growth, leading to the creation of a stronger, multi-corridor Eurasian transport network that is less likely to be influenced by Moscow's whims. This not only supports hypothesis H3, but also shows that China's response is not merely a route change, but a forced strategic adaptation that is in the national interest of reducing logistics reliance on Russia in the long run. Therefore, the diplomatic pressure for China to reopen its borders will not be absolute, but rather calculated, parallel to investment in alternative routes.

Table 2: Comparative analysis of China-European logistics routes (Q1-3, 2025)

Chapter 4: Narrative competition: Framing of conflict in the global information space (testing of hypothesis H4)

4.1 Cooperative Narrative between Russia and China: "NATO-based economic blockade"

The discourse used by Russia, Belarus and China converges into a narrative that portrays Polish actions as an aggressive, politically motivated "blockdown" aimed at jeopardizing China-EU trade. This narrative deliberately underestimates security contexts such as hybrid wars and sanctions, and frases the issue from a purely economic perspective. This creates a structure in which NATO has accused them of "take logistics hostages" in order to pursue a geopolitical agenda for Russia and, in turn, China.

4.2 NATO/EU counter narrative: "Legality, security, sovereignty"

Western responses consistently argue that border measures are a legitimate and necessary response to illegal and hostile actions. The main themes of this narrative are the legality of measures under the EU sanctions law, the need to respond to state-led hybrid wars, particularly the weaponization of immigrants, and the sovereign rights of NATO member states to protect their borders and airspace from deliberate invasions. Statements from Polish Prime Minister Tusk, Foreign Minister Sikorski and NATO Secretary-General Rutte show that a highly controlled message is being shared between Warsaw and Brussels.

4.3 Organizational response: Strategic communication and disinformation countermeasures

Behind the western narratives there is an organizational mechanism. NATO and the EU have a StratCom framework designed to actively counter disinformation from Russia and China. In particular, the common approach to hostile intelligence activities developed by NATO in 2024 (including early warning, aggressive messaging, and public nomination) strengthens this capability. The EU's "hybrid toolbox" and "hybrid response team" are also cited as related abilities.

4.4 Narrative War on the Undecided Class

The main targets of this narrative competition are not the opposing camp itself, but two important audiences. First, the European business world is responsible for the direct costs of logistical disruptions. Second, it is the "Global South" and non-allied countries where perceptions of the legitimacy of conflicts are questioned.

Both sides know that they cannot persuade each other, and their goal is to win the "battle of condemnation." The Russian-China "economic blockade" narrative is designed to appeal to the commercial interest class by portraying the issue as a turmoil in global trade caused by Western politics. This is aimed at easing border measures (due to pressure from companies) from within the EU. Meanwhile, the NATO/EU's "security needs" narrative aims to solidify domestic and allied support by positioning economic costs as a necessary price for security and the rule of law.

On the global stage, Russia and China use this narrative to portray NATO as an offensive actor that thwarts peaceful economic development (the main theme of BRI) and seek support from developing countries. In contrast, NATO portrays Russia and Belarus as rogue states that violate international norms (sovereignty, human rights) and strengthens their identity as defenders of the "rules-based international order." This supports Hypothesis H4 and indicates that information warfare is an important front in this conflict. The success of the long-term strategies on either side depends heavily on whether these key audiences can persuade the legitimacy of their actions, and the effectiveness of NATO StratCom activities is an important variable to monitor.

Chapter 5: Strategic Outlook and Actionable Conclusions (T-14: Until September 30, 2025)

5.1 Scenario Analysis (Short-term)

• S1: Constrained Stallund (Baseline Scenario - 65% Probability): The border remains effectively closed to sanctioned transits. Russia and Belarus maintain a stable but not escalating level of hybrid pressure (small provocation, disinformation). China will continue its dual approach to shifting logistics to intermediate corridors and maritime routes, diplomatically protesting. NATO will maintain a strengthened force.

• S2: Pressure inversion (deterioration scenario - 25% probability): The trigger is large-scale hybrid attacks (e.g., successful sabotages, casualties at the border, and intrusions by armed drones). Poland will implement a complete border closure, including passenger traffic, with support from NATO. Russia will make more aggressive military intimidation through emergency exercises. China could make harsher diplomatic denunciations and implement symbolic economic retaliation measures against Poland and Lithuania.

• S3: Limited conciliation (mitigation scenario - 10% probability): China's successful lobbying at the EU level, likely in conjunction with another global crisis that requires China's cooperation. The EU and Poland agree to limited and strictly controlled exceptional traffic over designated railway corridors with enhanced inspections for certain non-sanctioned, high-value items (e.g. auto parts). This is positioned as a technical adjustment rather than a political concession.

5.2 Early warning indicators (EWI) and KPI thresholds

• EWI to S2: ハイブリッド圧力スコア (KPI) exceeds [Threshold X] for two consecutive weeks. A fatal use of force against immigrants at the border by Belarusian security forces has been confirmed. This will cause GPS/communications interference that affects civil aviation near the border.

• EWI to S3: A high-level EU-China dialogue will be held, specifically addressing the railway connection between Poland and Belarus. An official statement has been issued from German and French industrial groups calling for a resolution. ハイブリッド圧力スコア shows a significant decrease in a sustained (more than 4 weeks).

5.3 Actionable conclusions and recommendations

• For National Security Planners (NATO/EU/Poland):

  • 結論: The "tripwire and reinforcements" model was effective, but it exposed the gap between command and control (C2) and information, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) in combating low-cost drones.

  • 行動: Standardize the concept of "Operation of the Eastern Sentinel" as a permanent rapid reinforcement mechanism for the entire Eastern Frank, and allocate the necessary resources. Accelerate the deployment of UAS (unmanned aerial vehicles systems) and integrate allied ISR information to create a common aviation situation diagram.

• For commercial logistics and supply chain managers:

  • 結論: The northern route via Poland and Belarus is no longer a reliable major corridor for time-constrained cargo and high value goods. The current confusion is not temporary, but rather structural.

  • 行動: Immediately begin a strategic review of supply chain route setting. Re-modeling of costs and transport times is re-established, assuming primary dependence on maritime transport and intermediate corridors. The current incompleteness of the intermediate corridor will be accepted as a new cost of resilience, ensuring the long-term transport capacity of the route.

• For diplomatic and strategic communications personnel:

  • 結論: The Russian-China narrative of "economic hostages" is expanding its support in some non-Western forums.

  • 行動: Enhance data-based, aggressive counter-narrative campaigns that provide evidence of physical threats at borders and legal basis for sanctions. It targets global business media and frags the growth of the mid-corridor as a positive development for global supply chain resilience, not a result of a Western "lockdown" but rather as a positive development for the resilience of the global supply chain, reducing authoritarian chokepoints.