**DR-THP-"Invisible US Seat"—An excuse for nuclear intimidation and E-MAD vulnerability assessment**

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DR-THP-"Invisible US seats"—An excuse for nuclear intimidation and evaluation of E-MAD vulnerability

Executive Summary and Key Judgments

Coatase

The central point of this report is that the essence of current geopolitical risks is not the physical use of nuclear weapons itself, but the plagiarism of nuclear weapons as "narrative weapons" by strategically irrational actors located at the heart of the Western Alliance. This action overturns the premise of economic mutual confirmation destruction (E-MAD) and triggers a systematic collapse of the international order after World War II. The most serious threat is not Russia's real nuclear fire, but the nuclear discourse being diverted by third parties as an excuse for intimidation.

The shortest route to breakup

The main causal chains identified by this report are as follows: First, future US administrations (especially assuming Trump's second-term administration) will borrow Russia's intimidating nuclear narrative and use it as a means of forcing the resolution of the Ukrainian conflict. Second, this action fundamentally destroys the US's "rational actor" status and leads to the fact that it is branded as a "nuclear rogue nation." Third, this collapse of confidence leads to a chained and irreversible collapse across three layers of diplomacy (the substantial tear of NATO), strategy (the conversion of the Indian nuclear doctrine), and finance (the collapse of the Petrodar system). This series of events is the essence of "invisibility of US seats."

Primary evaluation and conditions of inhibition

The stability of this system is crucially dependent on the international community's perception that the actions of the US president are "rational." Therefore, the following conditions are essential to prevent this catastrophic scenario: First, institutional checks and balances within the United States should be carried out in advance (enhancing Congressional supervision and tightening protocols for military and civilian control). Second, it is necessary to agree in advance on response protocols to clearly separate the very acts of deviance by US leaders from the US national institutions among allies. This report reveals that the essence of this crisis is not military-physical, but rather psychological and institutional vulnerabilities, and presents its structure, triggers and countermeasures.

Part I: The Vulnerable Foundations — The Fallows of E-MAD and Rationality

1.1 Balance of economic deterrence

Economic Mutual Assured Destruction (E-MAD) is not codified as an official doctrine, but refers to a de facto deterrence between major economic zones that are deeply interlinked. This is based on the basic principle of classical mutual confirmation destruction (MAD), namely, the theory that no actor has an incentive to commence conflicts, as the costs arising from conflicts far outweigh the potential benefits. Globalized supply chains, cross-border direct investment, and the international financial system based on the US dollar, have made large-scale military conflicts between major countries extremely expensive economically, and in itself have served as a powerful deterrent. This system forms a kind of stable balance based on shared economic interests without explicit agreement.

1.2 Single Point of Failure: Unreasonable Actor

The structural vulnerability of E-MAD lies in the fact that its deterrent power is entirely dependent on the assumption that it is a "rational actor." Whereas classical MAD is rooted in the fundamental and universal fear of the physical annihilation of states and civilizations, E-MAD is based on more complex and fragile calculations of economic costs and benefits. Deterrence theory has shown that effectiveness is significantly reduced for "irrational actors" who have different frameworks of values ​​and rationality. When actors emerge who prioritize short-term domestic political interests, personal prestige, or non-economic motivations, such as practice of "madman theory" in international relations, the deterrent of E-MAD becomes dysfunctional. For such actors, at the expense of stability in the international economic system, it could be a "rational" option to achieve their own political objectives. Furthermore, the liberal assumption that economic interdependence suppresses conflict is itself a vulnerability. Recent geopolitical trends have shown that interdependencies create vulnerability, and that in particular, asymmetric dependencies and supply chains of critical supplies can be "weaponized" from sources of peace into powerful means of intimidation. The assumption of economic stability of E-MAD can be secondary to geopolitical objectives. While classical MAD relies on the "hard" deterrence of physical survival, E-MAD is nothing more than a "soft" deterrence of economic pain. Economic collapse may be overcome, but nuclear winters do not allow survival. This asymmetry is an inherent design flaw that E-MAD can easily be overturned by ideology, domestic politics dynamics, or the personal judgment of leaders.

Part II: Trigger Events — Weaponization of Nuclear Narratives

2.1 The structure of "lowest price intimidation"

This report is positioned as the most important trigger event in scenarios in which future US administrations use nuclear intimidation as a means of diplomatic coercion over the Ukraine conflict. The specificity of this action lies in that it does not require a change in the physical alert position of US nuclear forces. This mechanism can be defined as "borrowing narratives." This is the act of the United States repurposing the intimidating nuclear discourse space that Russia has built up over the years and the fears it has instilled in Western countries for its own purposes at zero cost. The psychological impact that Russia has had on the international community by hinting at the nuclear threat has become a kind of "negative public good." With this existing fear, US actors can instantly and for free, simply using similar rhetoric to obtain the fruits of Russia's long-standing investments (military exercises, official statements, propaganda). This is the core mechanism of "lowest price intimidation." The probability of this scenario is supported by Trump's past words and actions. The attitude of viewing alliances as a deal, and examples of publicly declaring the movement of nuclear-weaponed (actually nuclear-promoted) submarines as negotiation tactics suggest a way of conduct that prioritizes short-term negotiation outcomes over traditional nuclear deterrence protocols and consideration for the security of allies. The "Rule of Don" pointed out by the Eurasian Group, a situation in which institutional restraints become dysfunctional and individual judgments define state actions increases the risk that such deviant actions will be carried out bypassing traditional policy-making processes.

2.2 The stage equipment called Belarus and Russia

For this trigger event from the US, the current nuclear posture of Russia and Belarus will serve as an essential "stage set." Russia: "I can't shoot, but I'll show you." Russia's dependence on nuclear weapons is consolidated in the aspect of threat and intimidation measures to compensate for the inferiority complex of conventional war forces towards the West and to maintain its position as a major power. However, its actual use involves aging infrastructure, maintenance issues, and, above all, serious physical and operational constraints: command and control (C2) systems that are overly centralized and have doubts of reliability at the ends. Furthermore, the absence of a clear military target of "where to shoot" also extremely high hurdles for actual use. Therefore, Russian nuclear weapons are not "weapons to shoot," but rather "political tools to show." Belarus: Performance in Vassal States Russia's tactical nuclear deployment in Belarus has a stronger implication as a political performance than as a military strategic implication. This is an action that President Lukashenko will act to demonstrate his loyalty to Russia based on the "rationality of survival" to maintain his authoritarian regime. Russia retains full authority over the management and operation of deployed nuclear weapons, and it is not possible for Belarus to use it independently. The true purpose of this deployment is nothing but strategic signaling to complicate NATO's decision-making process and to show a geographical expansion of Russia's nuclear threat. The normalization of nuclear intimidation by Russia and Belarus has the effect of "normalizing" the option of nuclear intimidation in the European security discourse space. It is this environment that similar rhetoric from the US, the core of the system, forms a soil that brings shocks to the extent that it destroys the system-wide premise, rather than just an additional threat. Putin's threat is a calculated intimidation, but similar statements by the US President will trigger a system collapse that destroys the very foundation of the international order. This asymmetry is the greatest danger of this scenario.

Part III: Chain-Chain Disintegration — Multi-domain Scenario Analysis

In this chapter, in a scenario tree form, we analyze the process from the baseline (S0) to the trigger event (S1), to the entire system rupture (S2), and to the final collapse (S3).

3.1 S0: Baseline that will set you nervous (current status)

The current geopolitical situation is characterized by factors such as continuous nuclear signaling by Russia, serious political divisions within the United States, the unity of the vulnerable Atlantic Union, and potential pressure on the Petrodar system. Although the system is functioning, it is exposed to multiple stressors and is less resistant to severe shock.

3.2 S1: Trigger — Weaponization of Nuclear Narratives

The US President clearly suggests the use of nuclear weapons with the aim of forcing the Ukraine conflict to end. This action is purely rhetorical and does not involve changes in physical force positions, such as raising the US military's Defcon level.

3.3 S2: ​​System ruptures — Simultaneous collapse in three layers

Trigger events cause chain collapse in three regions at about the same time.

3.3.1 Layer 1: Diplomatic Fracture (S2a)

3.3.2 Layer 2: Financial collapse (S2b)

3.4 S3: E-MAD's bankruptcy and post-American order

In this final stage, key mechanisms of global governance and finance will be disrupted. The world will move towards a new fragmented order, with regional blocs, competing currency spheres and the absence of "last lenders." At this stage, there is a growing movement to explore alternative international payment protocols and security frameworks, but the process becomes extremely unstable.

Table 1: Sequences and indicators of Petrodallar collapse
step
Stage 1: Political Signals
Stage 2: Large-scale funding withdrawal
Stage 3: System collapse

Part IV: Strategic Response Framework

4.1 Condemnation Doctrine: Principles of Action

This section presents a "Condemnation Consensus Guide." The aim is to establish a code of conduct that clearly distinguishes between a specific deviant "regulation" and a permanent "state institution" in the United States, which is essential for global stability.

4.2 Narrative and Communication Protocols

This section provides templates for external communication and operational guidance for requested "symbols."

Table 2: Comprehensive Trigger and Indicator Matrix
Scenario stage
S1
S2a
S2a
S2b
S3

Conclusion: Seat Revisualization — a protocol for US reengagement

The analysis in this report is integrated to define key performance indicators (KPIs) for the Seat Visualization Index. This is not just a conclusion, but a viable roadmap for the United States to restore its status as a trusted actor in the international community. The conditions for the international community to revisit US "seats" and accept reengagement are measured by specific and verifiable progress in three areas:

  1. Institutional Assurances (KPIs):

    • Enacting a new law to strengthen parliamentary war powers.

    • reform and legislation of protocols regarding the nuclear weapon launch approval process.

    • Restoring major international treaties and improving domestic laws to ensure compliance.

  2. Demonstration of civilian control (KPIs):

    • A clear and verifiable demonstration of the restoration of the balance of traditional civilian control.

    • It is publicly confirmed that the military leadership, an expert, is a role in advising the president's decisions and restraining them when necessary.

  3. Atonement to the System (KPIs):

    • The US will take the leading role in reconstructing financial and security architectures that have been hampered by the crisis.

    • To abandon unilateral activism and demonstrate a concrete attitude of contributing to the common good through cooperation with allies and international organizations.

The degree to which these KPIs are achieved constitutes the "seat visualization index." Only by this index exceeding a certain threshold will the United States be able to restore lost trust and regain its orthodox status in the international order.

Annex

Citations

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