Strategic evaluation: The conflict between "Putin's justice" and "merciless reality"

executive summary

This report aims to analyze recent geopolitical, military and economic events from multiple angles, and to clarify the serious discrepancy between the Kremlin's "justice" narrative and the "merciless reality" facing Russia. At the heart of the analysis is how the self-narrative of maintaining the Russian regime is being eroded by a series of interrelated crises: an unprecedented invasion of NATO airspace, a systematic attack on domestic energy infrastructure, and a fierce offensive attrition in Donbas.

First, a massive drone infringement of NATO airspace was a strategic bet to test the alliance's unity and divide, but it backfired completely. NATO immediately and in a multilateral, motivistic response, invoking a new military operation called the Eastern Sentry, which not only diplomatic condemnation, to strengthen its permanent defence. This shows that NATO's crisis response doctrine has evolved significantly from consultation to immediate operation, resulting in the unintended consequence of Russia's brink-based policy, which would rather strengthen the unity of the alliance rather than weaken it.

Second, Ukraine's sustained and precise attacks on domestic oil refineries and export ports in Russia have directly hit the lifeline of the Russian economy. In particular, the attack on the port of Primorsk in the Baltic Sea dysfunctioned the hub of Russia's "shadow fleet" and had a serious impact on export revenue. This economic war has caused a serious fuel crisis within the country, and is directly impacting the lives of people. The Kremlin is facing a strategic dilemma of sacrificing domestic economic stability to carry out the war, fundamentally shaking the implicit social contract of the Putin administration. This strategy in Ukraine is a calculated war of attrition that systematically destroys Russia's logistical base ahead of the winter season.

Third, Russia's massive offensive towards Pokrousk in Donbas has exposed serious logistical vulnerabilities despite its concentration of force. Russian military bloggers themselves have reported that supply to frontline forces are paralyzed, suggesting that Ukrainian precision attacks are beginning to establish an asymmetrical advantage over Russia's volume. The battle at Pokrousk highlights the reality of Russia's "papier-maid juggernauts (huge, apparently powerful force)."

These military, economic and diplomatic realities create a gap that is no longer interposed between the Kremlin propaganda and the reality that the people face every day. This narrative's collapse is not merely a public relations issue, but a strategic debt that threatens the very stability of the administration.

Based on the above analysis, this report makes the following three policy recommendations to Western allies:

1. Coordinating alliance deterrents and responses : Formalize the "Eastern Sentry" operation as a permanent, ready-to-read protocol for provocative actions that are less than Article 5 of the NATO Convention, and develop staged response options in advance.

2. Systematizing economic pressure : An international collaboration will be launched targeting three points of insurance, classification society and ports of call that support Russia's "shadow fleet," neutralizing the oil export ecosystem itself.

3. Optimizing Ukraine support : To maximize the vulnerability of Russian military forces in the winter, Ukraine will provide information and target selection support for Russia's domestic fuel "distribution" networks (railroad nodes, pipeline facilities, storage sites).

These recommendations aim to exploit the structural vulnerabilities Russia faces and to secure a strategic advantage towards ending the conflict by accelerating the clash between the Kremlin's self-narrative and reality.

Part I: NATO Frontier — Escalation Miscalculation

Russia's drone invasion of Polish airspace is analysed as a strategic reconnaissance action intended to test NATO's resolve and sow discord within the alliance. However, this action backfired dramatically. As a result, NATO has become more united, and has built a stronger, more practical defense position.

1.1 Airspace violations on September 10th: strategic reconnaissance or reckless runaway?

On the night of September 9th and 10th, an unprecedented formation of about 19 Russian drones violated the airspace of Poland, a member of NATO, and some of them infiltrated 300 miles (about 480 kilometers) inland. The airspace breach took place as part of a massive airstrike operation against Ukraine using more than 400 drones and more than 40 missiles, and continued for about seven hours. Polish authorities have determined that the scale and duration of the case was not contingent, but intentional.

In response, Russia officially denied the invasion. The Kremlin dismissed the accusations as "unfounded" and as intended to "grush the Ukrainian crisis." Belarus also suggested that the drone may have been out of course due to electronic interference on the Ukrainian side.

This infringement led to an immediate kinetic response by NATO. This was the first time a NATO allied had used its power over Russian drones since the start of the Ukrainian War. In addition to the Polish Air Force's F-16 fighter jet, multinational forces were used in the interceptor operations, including Dutch F-35 fighter jets, Italian early warning and control aircraft (AWACS), and German Patriot surface-to-air missile system.

Initially, US President Trump made ambiguous comments that "may have been a mistake," which sparked concerns among allies such as Poland. However, this early response was promptly revised by an official statement by the US Ambassador of the NATO and acting United Nations representative. The two have reaffirmed their firm determination to "define every detail of NATO's territory."

This series of events is unlikely to be merely an accident. The scale, duration of the infringement, and coordination with a large-scale attack on Ukraine strongly suggest that this was a deliberate strategic reconnaissance to test NATO's air defense capabilities, political cohesion and reaction times. It is likely that Russia was hoping that NATO would split and show a hesitant response, especially against the backdrop of President Trump's actions. But what actually happened was the exact opposite. The swift, multinational military response and the quick political unity that followed indicates that Russia's strategic bet has failed. This failure has resulted in a consequence of Russia's interests, namely the reality of a more vigilant and united NATO.

1.2 Alliance response: Implementing the "Eastern Sentry"

Following the infringement of the airspace, Poland invoked Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty and requested emergency consultations. In response, on September 12, just two days after the invasion, NATO announced the launch of a new military operation, the Eastern Sentry. This new multi-territory military operation aims to strengthen the defensive position of the Alliance's "unlimited period" overall Franks.

Early troops provided to the operation included French Rafale fighters, Danish F-16 fighters and frigates and German Eurofighter fighters, with the UK also saying its support. General Alexus Glinkewich, Commander-in-Chief of the European Union (SACEUR), described this as a "all-new defense initiative," and said it was intended to integrate aviation and ground defense systems, improve information sharing, and rapidly deploy new anti-drone technology. The scope of this operation is not limited to the Polish border, but covers the entire eastern Frank, from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea.

This series of moves marks a significant evolution in NATO's crisis response doctrine. In the past, the invocation of Article 4 of the Convention has often led to consultation-level responses, mainly joint statements and diplomatic partnerships. However, this time, in just 48 hours, the company moved to the start of a military operation with a formal name in which multinational assets were put into use. This is unprecedented speed. This fact means that Article 4 of the Convention has altered its role from a mere consultation venue to a trigger for a pre-planned, practical military response.

This will result in future provocations by Russia not merely convening a meeting, but will be met with the immediate or strengthening of the existing framework of the Eastern Sentry. This is essentially lowering the political and bureaucratic hurdles for coordinated military responses to threats less than Article 5 of the Convention without altering the language of the official Rules of Engagement. As a result, NATO's deterrent has become more reliable, sending a clear signal to Russia that the alliance's engagement provisions have been substantially strengthened.

1.3 Diplomatic Ripples: A Showdown at the UN Security Council

With the request from Poland and the support of members of European board members including Denmark, France, Greece, Slovenia and the UK, the UN Security Council convened an emergency meeting on September 12th. The meeting marked the stage for an international diplomatic showdown against Russia's actions.

US representative Ambassador Dorothy Shea sternly condemned the airspace violation as a "concerning situation" and a "severe insult to the US' sincere efforts to end the conflict" that took place after the Alaska summit. The United States officially stated that it was in consultation with its allies under Article 4 of the treaty, emphasizing that it was a response in accordance with a legal framework.

Meanwhile, Russia denied all the allegations, declaring this as a "myth" and claiming it had no intention or involvement. The Russian side called for evidence to be presented despite the widespread physical evidence and multinational tracking data.

While UN Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo (in charge of politics and peacebuilding) said that the UN cannot conduct its own verification, he pointed out that the incident was "the first time multiple drones have flew through the airspace of such deep neighbouring countries," emphasizing the "realistic risks of expansion" of the conflict.

This conflict at the Security Council highlighted Russia's isolation. Russia's claim of "no evidence" was less convincing in the face of radar data and interception facts shared by its allies, further decreasing Russia's credibility in the international community. This diplomatic defeat clearly showed that military provocation was politically costly.

Part II: Breaking the Engines — The War of Economic Attrition

This chapter argues the direct causal relationship between how Ukraine's systematic attacks on Russian energy infrastructure have led to a serious domestic fuel crisis, which creates fatal vulnerability to Russian military logistics ahead of the winter season.

2.1 Baltic Front: neutralising the lifeline of Russia's oil exports

On the night of September 12, a drone from the Ukrainian Security Agency (SBU) carried out a massive attack on the port of Primorsk, Russia's largest oil supply port in the Baltic Sea and the terminal destination of the Baltic pipeline system. The attack caused a fire to occur at least two tankers (Kust and Kai Yun) belonging to the "Shadow Fleet" used to avoid Russian sanctions, as well as a pump facility within the port, causing all oil shipments to be stopped. The port, which handles around 60 million tonnes of oil per year and brings about $15 billion in revenue to Moscow, could result in a loss of up to $41 million per day.

Following the attack on the port of Primorsk, the Kirisi refinery in Leningrad, one of Russia's largest oil refineries, was also hit by a drone, resulting in a temporary fire.

These attacks are not isolated cases, but are part of a systematic and intensifying campaign. In August, attacks on 10 refineries lost at least 17% of Russia's refinery capacity (1.1 million barrels per day). Furthermore, the nearby port of Ustil Luga has already lost its capacity in the August attack, forcing Russia to divert oil transport to Primorsk port. This made the Port of Primorsk a more important and vulnerable target.

Table 1: Analysis of the impact of attacks on Russia's Baltic energy infrastructure

2.2 Inner Crisis: Collapse of the Russian domestic fuel market

The attacks on refineries directly caused a serious fuel crisis within Russia. Several regions, including the southern Russia, the Far East and the occupied Crimea, have reported shortages, long lines at refueling stations, and introduction of rationing systems.

Economic indicators confirm the severity of this crisis. Wholesale prices for A-95 gasoline have risen by more than 50% since January, reaching a record high. Retail prices continue to rise weekly, with data from the Russian Federation Statistics Office (Rosstat) showing significant price increases in dozens of regions.

The Kremlin's main response to this is the implementation of temporary and gradual stricter bans on gasoline exports, and reliance on subsidies such as price control and "damper payments," which have become apparently insufficient.

This fuel crisis exposes a fundamental strategic dilemma for the Kremlin. In order to secure war funding and maintain the military, oil exports and military consumption will have to prioritize. As a result, the domestic private market will function as shock absorbers. The nation is forced to "cannibalize" the lives of its people and the stability of its domestic economy in order to carry out the war. The export ban is a hopeless measure to sacrifice long-term revenue in exchange for short-term domestic stability, indicating a failure in strategic management. This situation destroys the implicit social contract of the Putin era, namely economic stability in exchange for political indifference. The fuel crisis makes the costs of war concrete and personal to the general Russian public, in a way that is different from the number of war dead.

2.3 Winter Nexus: Fuel shortages and military logistics

Analysis shows that Russia has a surplus of diesel fuel used by many military heavy equipment, and the current situation is "difficult but manageable." However, the crisis will not only affect gasoline for light transport vehicles, but will disrupt the entire production and distribution ecosystem of fuels, including specialized products such as aviation fuels and lubricants. The timing of the Ukraine attack is intentionally designed to coincide with the peak demand of the harvest season and holiday season, and to advance the winter season, when demand is rising.

This Ukrainian campaign is not a random attack. It is a calculated logistical attrition strategy aimed at maximizing Russia's vulnerability ahead of the winter season. Winter wars are logistical battles and rely heavily on fuel for heating, transportation and power generation. The Ukrainian attack systematically reduced Russia's fuel "production" capabilities from August to September. This prevents Russia from building its usual seasonal stockpile.

As a result, Russia will be in winter with its stockpiles running out and its production infrastructure is damaged. This creates a deadly vulnerability for the Russian army. Even if the military has priority access to diesel fuel, system-wide vulnerabilities mean that any future disruption (e.g., attacks on major rail distribution sites) could have a disproportionate impact on the front line's fighting capabilities. This has the potential to paralyze the ability of Russian forces to carry out offensive or defensive operations during the harsh winter. Ukraine is attacking its logistical foundations themselves before Russia's winter operations begin.

Part III: Donbass fulcrum — Battle of Pokrousik

This chapter analyzes the Russian offensive against Pokrousk. The offensive, despite its large-scale focus on troops, poses serious logistical weaknesses and argues that it is a "papier-maid juggernaut" that is extremely vulnerable to Ukraine's logistical attrition strategy.

3.1 The epicenter of the offensive: Russia's targets and troop concentration

Currently, Pokrovsk is the most combative region on all fronts, and is Russia's main offensive target. Russia has gathered large forces of up to 100,000 to 110,000 for this offensive. The strategic goal is to "a decisive breakthrough" by occupying the Pokrousk-Mirnograd metropolitan area and eventually expanding towards Kramatrsk-Kostchanchiniuka, completing the occupation of the entire Donetsk region.

The Russian military combines a variety of tactics, including large-scale charges using armored vehicles, penetration by small sabotage and reconnaissance groups (SRGs), and intense artillery bombardment and airstrikes. He explores weaknesses on a wide range of fronts, and there is also a record of 64 charges in one day, the highest ever.

3.2 Vulnerable offensive: Frontline mechanics and logistical vulnerability

Despite this overwhelming pressure, Ukrainian forces have reportedly repelled most of the attack and maintained control of their defensive positions. Ukrainian authorities say the situation is serious but is "under control" and is stabilizing.

What is critically important is that Russian military bloggers have reported that logistics in the Pokrousk area are in a "devastating situation." They reported that Ukrainian drones completely paralyze supply routes and frontline forces lack ammunition, water and fuel. The side of the road is "scattered with burned Russian equipment," which is said to have a serious impact on the morale of soldiers. This internal report is also consistent with OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) analysis that Russia's offensive capabilities are "very unstable."

This situation shows a serious gap between the "size" of the Russian military that gathered in Pokrovsk and its "sustainability." The forces of over 100,000 people suggest an overwhelming advantage, but internal reports on logistical collapse reveal fatal structural weaknesses. This is not a huge force that functions in lubrication, but a "papier-maid juggernaut" with a huge mass, yet a brittle and insufficient logistics.

While Western and Ukrainian intelligence agencies are accurately aware of the massive gathering of forces, field reports from Russian sources reveal that the logistics "last miles" is dysfunctional. An army that cannot stably supply basic supplies such as water and ammunition to frontline forces, regardless of their size, cannot sustain high-intensity offensive operations for long periods of time. The threat to Ukraine is therefore not to be overwhelmed by pure quantities, but to the collapse of local lines of defense before Russian offensive is exhausted by the limits of its own logistics. Ukraine's main goal should be to accelerate the Russian logistics collapse.

The battle at Pokrousk is a microcosm of the war's overall dynamics: the battle between the Russian system, which is based on mass and exhaustion, and the Ukrainian system, which is based on precision, adaptability, and logistical targeting (enabled by Western technology). Russia's strategy is to put troops and shells into question. Ukraine's response to this is to use cheaper and more precise systems (drones) to attack the high-value logistics network that supports Russia's mass, as the dissatisfaction of military bloggers shows. This is an asymmetric approach. Ukraine doesn't need to counter it with tanks anti-tanks if it can prevent fuel and shells from reaching Russian tanks. The supply line "paralysed" in Pokrousic is a direct result of this systemic difference. Ukraine is beginning to win the logistics battle, and this is a leading indicator of who will ultimately win the athletic battle.

Part IV: The War of Symbols — The Narrative Collapse and Strategic Implications

This chapter combines previous analyses and discusses how the Kremlin's narrative of control is beginning to collapse under the pressure of observable reality. This has a significant impact on both international support for Ukraine and stability within Russia.

4.1 Analysis of competing stories: "Putin's Justice" vs. "Relentless Reality"

The Kremlin propaganda ecosystem consistently portrays the war as a legitimate cause battle against offensive NATO, claiming that the alliance poses a threat to Russia. However, the story was directly denied by events from September 10th to 12th. In this incident, Russia became a clear invader of NATO members, leading to unified condemnation at the United Nations and strengthening the eastern Franks of the Alliance. Similarly, the story of Russia as an "energy superpower" is violated by footage of its citizens lining up for gasoline.

By contrasting the official Russian statements (such as Spokesman Peskov's denial) with overwhelming and multifaceted evidence on drone breaches, port fires and fuel crises, the report uncovers the no longer sustainable gap between the Kremlin narrative and verifiable facts.

For many years, the Kremlin has used the story of itself "reacting" to NATO's "provocation." However, the airspace violation on September 10th reversed this structure. Russia has now become a clear and undeniable provocateur against NATO. This one event significantly undermines the credibility of Russia's fundamental reasons for war, making it difficult for Moscow to gain sympathy from its non-aligned countries, and makes it easier for NATO to justify its own defense. The claim that Russia used to justify its 2022 invasion that "NATO expansion is a threat" relies on portraying Russia as a defensive actor. By sending 19 drones deep into Polish airspace, Russia acted as a blatant invader. This action provides concrete evidence that NATO's defense posture is not a "cause" of Russian invasion, but a "response" to it. This fundamentally overturns Russia's long-standing diplomatic and information efforts, giving NATO a powerful tool to justify its military investment and posture.

4.2 The Politics of Image: "The King Protects Himself" vs. "I am here."

This section deals directly with users' hypotheses regarding "symbolic politics." Here we analyze the strategic impact of leadership visibility. President Zelensky's frequent appearance near the frontline projects the image of shared risk and national unity ("I'm here"). This contrasts with Putin's more remotely controlled appearance. Especially in the event of a national crisis such as a fuel shortage, the latter could give the impression that it is a divergence from the hardships of the people, or that it is a leader who prioritizes his own security over the security of the nation ("The King protects himself").

We assess how this symbolic conflict affects the following key strategic factors:

• International theory : Strengthen the story of "David vs. Goliath" and solidify support for Ukraine.

• Alliance unity : President Zelensky's leadership will serve as a powerful moral and political pillar for ongoing military and financial support from the West.

• Sustainability of sanctions : Clear moral contrasts make it politically easier for Western governments to maintain and strengthen sanctions in the face of economic costs.

• Morale in Russia : Although it is difficult to measure, the perception that leaders are far away during specific difficult times can undermine public trust and reduce the willingness to make sacrifices for war.

4.3 Integrated Strategic Perspective

This section combines the analysis from Parts I to III and discusses the simultaneously worsening of Russia's strategic position in all areas. Failure to reconnaissance against NATO indicates a loss of escalation control. The successful attacks on energy infrastructure indicate new and serious economic vulnerabilities. The fragile offensive at Pokrousk indicates a decline in military capabilities.

These events form a negative feedback loop. Military failures force the Kremlin into dangerous reconnaissance actions, such as violating NATO airspace, which backfired diplomatically. The Ukrainian economic war (refinery attack) directly exacerbates military logistics for major Russian offensives, creating a self-enhancing cycle of decline.

The failure of the Kremlin narrative is not merely a public relations issue, but a strategic debt. As the gap between propaganda and reality widens, the administration will have to invest more authoritative resources to maintain control within the country. In the early days of the war, patriotic enthusiasm and media control could have maintained public support. However, the costs of wars, such as fuel shortages and rising prices, are now concrete for the people. Trust in the nation is eroding when the official story ("everything is under control") directly contradicts the daily experiences of citizens (empty gas stations). States that cannot rely on trust will be forced to rely on fear and coercion (e.g. oppression and mobilization). This is a much more vulnerable and resource-consuming control method. Thus, narrative collapse directly affects the stability of the regime by forcing the regime to adopt inefficient and vulnerable mechanisms.

Part V: Policy Proposal

This chapter presents concrete and viable policy recommendations that are derived directly from the analysis up to the previous chapter.

5.1 To Allies: Coordinating Deterrence and Response

Recommendations : Formalize and expand the "Eastern Sentry" framework as a permanent, ready-to-read protocol for provocative acts that do not follow Article 5 of the NATO Convention.

implementation : Pre-approve the "option menu" for step-by-step response. This will allow the North Atlantic Board to respond in hours rather than days, rather than days, by selecting from a set of previously agreed actions (e.g., strengthening combat air patrols, deploying additional air defense assets, targeted cyber responses). This allows you to take the initiative and strengthen your deterrent.

5.2 Towards economic pressure: systematic destruction of funding lines

Recommendations : Moves the focus of economic wars from Russian oil itself to the logistical ecosystem, particularly the "shadow fleet" that enables its export.

implementation : Start a coordinated multi-agency pressure campaign targeting the following three points:

1. Insurance Company : Sanctions are imposed on any entities that provide P&I (ship owner liability) insurance on ships involved in Russian oil trade.

2. Classification Association : Cancel classification of any vessels that have been discovered to have "dark fleet" activities or unauthorized transfer of ships (STS);

3. Port Access : Working with partner countries in major transit and import hubs, denying access and service to ports around the world to any vessel identified as part of the "shadow fleet."

5.3 To support Ukraine: Exploiting vulnerability in winter

Recommendations : Provides Ukraine with advanced information and target selection support, specialized in the Russian fuel "distribution" network.

implementation : Prioritize sharing of information regarding the location and status of important railway nodes, pipeline pump facilities and fuel storage direct supply to the eastern and southern Russian forces. This non-violent (from the perspective of the allies) support from the allies allows Ukraine to maximize the effectiveness of its own mortality attacks. This allows Russia's domestic fuel crisis to be transformed into a catastrophic logistical failure of the Russian army in the winter without the need for direct intervention from its allies.