Anatomy of collapse: Identifying systemic nexus in Tricolor subprime car loan ABS bankruptcy

I. Executive Summary

Hypothesis regarding "Deutsche Bank"

The role of the central instigator in this case was not carried out by a single entity; JPMorgan Chase and Barclays It concludes that this was achieved through a major investment bank syndicate, with the focus on the results. These banks were both key funding providers (warehouse lenders) and dual functions of lead underwriters and sales agents for asset-backed securities (ABS). It is this dual function that positions them as a node of risk creation and global spread (nexus), making them functionally equivalent to the investment banks in the 2008 financial crisis. Allegations of due diligence during the warehouse financing stage and ABS's subsequent active marketing efforts constitute the core of this systemic bankruptcy.

Analysis of "Great Escape"

Available evidence suggests that the lead manager's bank was the first to sense fraud. The fact that they restricted trading of Tricolor-related ABS before the full story of the bankruptcy was made public strongly suggests that they have launched defensive measures to mitigate their own risk. This means that they likely have already hedged or sold their most harmful exposures and left the most risky unrated or subordinated tranches in the hands of slower reactions downstream institutional investors.

Systemic risk assessment

The initial market response appears to be treating Tricolor's collapse as an idiosyncratic fraud case rather than a sector-wide issue. This can also be seen in the credit spreads of high yield bonds, which are still at tight levels. However, this peace is a serious error price (mispricing) of risk. The real danger is that contagion of mistrust freezes the entire market for issuing subprime automotive loans, cutting off funding to other lenders. The cross risk with "The Night of Valpurgis" is not merely a matter of interest rate competition. This is a fluidity amplifier. Credit shocks from the ABS market can cause flight-to-quality if they clash with US Treasury markets, which are already tight due to mass supply, could lead to a serious liquidity crisis.

Key decisions and scenarios

1. Base case: Most of the lead managers avoid losses, and losses concentrate as certain institutional investors (such as asset management companies, insurance companies, etc.) grab the "last old lady." Contagion will be limited to rapid repricing of the subprime automotive loan ABS sector and a temporary freeze on new issuances.

2. Downside Case: It turns out that the "baba" was a systemically important institution such as pension funds and local banks, leading to wider financial instability.

3. Tail risk scenario ("Perfect Storm"): The crises of trust spread beyond car loan ABS to other securitized products, in sync with the US Treasury market turmoil at the "Night of Valpurgis." This leads to widespread credit market dysfunction.

II. Tricolor Securitization Machine: Structure and Destruction Points

A. Originated to Distribute Model: Veils of the Name of Social Mission

Business Model

Tricolor adopted an integrated "Buy Here Pay Here" model that consistently inaugurates, finances and servicing subprime car loans. The company's rapid growth was driven by its ability to access capital markets. Since 2022 alone, it has issued approximately $2 billion worth of ABS, and has implemented a total of more than $5 billion in loans. This business model is a typical example of "originate to distribution," which generates large amounts of high-risk loans and sells them to external investors in the form of securitization.

Target group and ESG angle

The company clearly targeted the "credit invisible" Hispanic communities, including borrowers who do not have a Social Security number. This strategy was packaged under the narrative of "social contributions to the environment, social, and governance) investment, and was certified by the US Treasury as a Regional Development Financial Institution (CDFI). This CDFI certification was more than just a simile of words. It was a pivotal marketing tool and a structural element that allowed banks to invest in Tricolor securities to fulfill their Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) obligations. This veil of "social mission" could have underestimated risk for investors and regulators.

The fundamental problem

However, behind this positive story, compliance issues were frequent. Tricolor has previously settled with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) for a violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act. Furthermore, a 2022 investigative report by Barons magazine raised serious questions about the company's lending practices and the quality of the vehicles it sells. These facts suggest that there was structural vulnerability in the company's compliance regime and operations even before its final collapse.

B. Anatomy of alleged fraud: The collapse of double collateral

The core doubt

The core of the allegations being investigated by the US Department of Justice (DOJ) is that the same group of car loans were being handed over multiple warehouse lenders simultaneously as collateral (double collateral). This is the most basic contraindication in secured finance, and implies a fatal dysfunction in both internal control within Tricolor and external verification processes through loan transactions.

The collapse of the management system

A statement by Fifth Third Bank CEO Tim Spence speaks to the seriousness of the problem. "Based on our continued investigation, there appears to be material fraud in the collateral submitted to support the borrowing base in all warehouse facilities, as well as the company's audited financial statements." This statement suggests that the fraud could have been organized, not just a single collateral file, but also an entire corporate financial reporting, indicating that the following management structure had completely collapsed:

• Servicing Management and Custodian Auditing: The securitization system assumes that accurate loan-level data, including vehicle identification numbers (VINs), is closely tracked and managed by custodians. The double collateral was made, which means that this basic verification process either failed or was intentionally avoided.

• Warehouse Render Due Diligence: Warehouse renderers such as JPMorgan, Fifth Third and Barclays are the first line of defense to prevent fraud. Their failure to see through this double collateral allegation reveals a serious flaw in their company's risk management protocols.

This series of bankruptcies shows how fundamental risk management has been neglected behind the rapid growth of socially-based companies. The "certification" of CDFI may have rather dulled the sense of vigilance of inherent operational and fraud risks, creating a kind of moral hazard. In other words, the narrative of a company's mission has overshadowed the most fundamental financial due diligence of confirming the physical presence of collateral.

C. ABS Pipeline: From "High Risk Loans" to "Social Bonds"

TAST Deal Structure

Tricolor consolidated the loans it originated into a vehicle called the Tricolor Auto Securitization Trust (TAST) and securitized them. Cases such as TAST 2025-1 ($328 million) and TAST 2025-2 ($217 million) have a structure divided into multiple tranches, and credit enhancement was achieved using methods such as overcollectivation, subordinated debt supplementation, cash reserve accounts, and excess spreads.

Key stakeholders

Several specialized agencies were involved in this securitization process.

• Originator and Servicer: Tricolor Auto Acceptance, LLC. Responsible for originating and managing loans.

• Backup Servicer: Vervent, Inc. It will take on the role of taking over the servicer operations if Tricolor defaults. The role after bankruptcy will become extremely important.

• Trustee: Wilmington Trust. A trust bank that represents the interests of investors in ABS trusts.

• Rating Company: Kroll Bond Rating Agency (KBRA), Moody's, and S\&P had given ratings for each case. These institutions are currently reviewing all related ratings in a direction of downgrading.

Quality of collateral assets

The quality of the securitized loan pool was extremely risky. For example, the collateral assets in TAST 2025-2 have a weighted average FICO score of just 600, which is surprising 62% of borrowers had no credit scores at all . The core of this scheme was to convert assets with such extremely high risk characteristics into investment grade products using the financial engineering of securitization. However, if there was fraud in the underlying collateral assets, then this whole structure would have been a tower on the sand.

III. Identifying the Nexus: The role of investment banks

A. Warehouse Render: The collapse of the first line of defense

Key players and their exposures

JPMorgan Chase, Fifth Third Bancorp and Barclays were the leading warehouse lenders to initial funding for Tricolor's loan origination. These banks have large and roughly equal exposure, with each bank facing a potential loss of around $200 million from this credit line. Regional banks such as Origin Bank, Renasant Bank and Triumph Bank also had exposure, but the size was relatively small.

Due diligence failure

Warehouse facilities are the first place to which collateral is submitted and are located at the top of the financial supply chain. The double collateral that is believed to have occurred here means a fundamental failure of due diligence in this early stage. These sophisticated financial institutions with a wide range of risk management departments have failed to implement or enforce sufficient management systems to detect the classical method of collateral fraud. This raises serious questions about whether the pursuit of fee revenue and market share in the profitable subprime automotive loan market has led to the relaxation of basic risk management standards.

B. Underwriter: Global distributor of contaminated financial products

Syndicate

The same banking group, centered around JPMorgan and Barclays, served as lead structuring agents, bookrunners and sales managers in subsequent ABS issues. They were not merely passive funders, but the very designers of financial products sold to global investors.

"Originate to Distribute" moral hazard

This dual role creates a strong incentive to separate it from the balance sheet regardless of the quality of the asset. After providing early warehouse loans, the fastest way for banks to collect funds and secure profits was to securitize and sell the loan. This is a classic moral hazard structure, with the ability to pass risk on downstream investors significantly undermining the incentive for thorough due diligence.

"Great Escape"

The fact that JPMorgan and Barclays limited trading of Tricolor-related ABS after obtaining "significant unpublished information" but before the entire market collapsed, is conclusive evidence. This suggests that they first exploited their privileged position to protect themselves. This behavior is very similar to the 2008 financial crisis when some banks were selling RMBS to their customers while also betting on its decline in value.

C. Historical Analogies: 2008 Deutsche Bank Playbook

Similarities of fraud

The allegations against Tricolor's underwriter are surprisingly similar to the recorded actions of Deutsche Bank during the RMBS crisis. A U.S. Department of Justice's investigation of Deutsche Bank found that it intentionally securitized defective mortgages, falsely deceived the quality of underwriting standards, and concealed known risks from investors.

Modern equivalent

In the Tricolor case, the "defects" in the collateral were not merely poor underwriting standards, but rather the obvious allegations of double collateral. The underwriting secretaries involved as warehouse lenders were most advantageous in understanding the true status of the collateral. Nevertheless, the formation and sale of these assets meant that they essentially circulated the market financial products that they should have known to be at least very suspicious and, in the worst case, to be fraudulently contaminated. In terms of their direct involvement in both funding and sales, the syndicate, centered around JPMorgan and Barclays, could be said to be "playing Deutsche Bank" in this case. This syndicate structure makes it difficult to identify a single "villain" as in 2008, but also has the effect of obscuring the location of responsibility. It is possible to argue that each row shifted responsibility to each other and relied on the due diligence of other banks. But they Functions that played as a group is a hub for risk centralised processing and sales, and it is essential to identify this collective function in understanding the mechanisms of risk spreading in the modern financial system.

Table 1: Key stakeholders and their roles in the Tricolor securitization ecosystem

IV. Contagion Mapping: Exposure and Systemic Impact

A. "Baba" holder: Identifying final investor exposure

The known holder

Public disclosure materials and reports reveal that the institutional investors who owned Tricolor ABS were a sophisticated group of professionals. This includes PIMCO、Angel Oak、Janus Henderson、Virtus Investment Partners Asset management companies such as Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance, Nationwide Life It includes major insurance companies such as: This indicates that risk was widely distributed without being contained within the banking sector.

Loss severity rating by tranches

Price crashes in the secondary market indicate in real time the expected magnitude of losses. Bid prices for subordinated tranches ('D', 'E', 'F') have plummeted to 20-30 cents at face value, suggesting that they are expected to lose almost entirely. Although the senior tranche 'A' Note is trading at a relatively high price (80-90 cents), it still suggests losses, making it an extremely unusual situation for a top-ranked tranche in cases involving fraud.

The peculiarity of Black Rock

BlackRock's involvement is unique in that it includes holdings of ABS as well as direct investments in preferred stocks of $90 million through the Impact Opportunities Fund. The stock is now considered to be zero. This means double exposure, a significant reputational blow to the company's ESG and impact investment division.

B. Credit Market Impact Assessment: Is it an individual event or a coal mine canary?

Market initial reaction

The immediate response in the broader credit market was limited. The ICE BofA US High Yield Index Option Adjusted Spread (HY OAS) has been at a historic low of around 2.8% as of September 2025, indicating that the market views the Tricolor problem as a fraud case unique to a company, rather than a systemic problem that spreads across the sector.

Health in the Subprime Auto Loan Sector

However, this market calm is in contrast to the worsening fundamentals. The 60-day or more late rate for subprime car loans is the second highest since 2006. The loss rate for subprime ABS is also on the rise. Other lenders are also showing signs of stress, including Automotive Credit Corp. halting new lending. Peter Cecchini of Axonic Capital has clearly warned that the situation could be a "coal mine canary in the subprime auto loan market" caused by reckless underwriting standards fueled by insatiable demand from ABS investors.

Possibility of repricing

Tricolor's fraud case could trigger the entire market to reevaluate underwriting standards and collateral verification in the subprime auto loan ABS sector. This could suddenly spike spreads for all issuers across the sector as investors demand a higher risk premium.

C. Cross risk with "The Night of Valpurgis": Liquidity Collision Course

U.S. Treasury Market Status

September has historically been a difficult month for the bond market, and is often referred to as the "September Curse." This period is characterized by a flood of new corporate bond issuances that compete for investors' funds. This mass supply has already put upward pressure on long-term government bond yields, with 30-year bond yields approaching 5%.

Interaction effects

The risk here is the creation of a dangerous feedback loop.

1. Credit Shock: The Tricolor problem creates a crisis of trust in subprime ABS and potentially other complex credit products.

2. Escape to quality: Investors sell risky assets like ABS and flood the safest assets, US Treasury.

3. Liquidity Crunch: This sudden and large-scale demand for government bonds clashes with a market that is already struggling to absorb the large amount of new government and corporate bonds issuance. This could lead to market functioning in severity, causing price discontinuities (gaps) and volatility to rise (the awakening of the "bond vigilantes.").

4. Feedback loop: The resulting market turmoil and liquidity freeze will force further sales of credit assets to secure cash, amplifying the initial credit shock.

The real danger of this scenario is not the direct losses of Tricolor itself. it is, Process transmission It is. The discovery that the fundamental process of collateral verification has collapsed in major regulated US financial institutions has led investors and regulators to the natural question, "If it happened here, then wouldn't it happen anywhere else?" If this question spreads to other non-bank lenders and other types of ABS, a credit contraction is inevitable. It could lead to a wider credit market freeze that goes beyond the subprime car loan market.

Table 2: Estimated exposures for major financial institutions and investors classes

V. Scenario Evaluation and Strategic Recommendations

A. Scenario 1: "The Mastermind" has escaped (high probability)

Scenario overview

In this scenario, we assume that lead managers, JPMorgan and Barclays, have effectively hedged their exposure using prior information on fraud. This could include shorting the subprime automotive loan ABS index, purchasing credit protection for a particular tranche, or selling your holdings to unsuspecting customers before limiting transactions.

Possible impact

The direct losses to the lead manager are limited to the initial warehouse loan allowance for doubtful accounts. The ultimate loss will be borne by the subordinated and institutional investors who purchased the mezzanine tranche. The market will treat this case as a limited amount, but the subprime automotive loan ABS sector experiences painful repricing, and new issuances from small, poorly-proven originators will fall into a "buyer-free."

Indicators to monitor

Absurdity of ABS trading losses at JPMorgan/Barclays' upcoming financial results briefing. A sudden divergence between Prime and Subprime car loan ABS spreads. Sudden halt of new issuance calendar for Subprime Auto Loan ABS.

B. Scenario 2: The "Last Baba" holder is the system itself (medium probability)

Scenario overview

The risk has been effectively passed on, but its final holders are systemically susceptible institutions, such as public pension funds and small regional banks that have been attracted to ESG narratives for their "yield pursuit." The losses aren't enough to shake up major investment banks, but they are large enough to damage the capital of these small players.

Possible impact

This could lead to a "mini-financial crisis," which could require small banks to bail out or forced mergers. Public pension funds report significant valuation losses, leading to political backlash and demands for investigation into their investment practices. The reputation damage to the ESG investment industry will be serious and long-term.

Indicators to monitor

Disclosure of Tricolor ABS holdings in 13F filing of major pension funds. Announcement of unexpected allowances for doubtful accounts by local banks. Surge in credit default swap (CDS) prices on local bank obligations.

C. Scenario 3: Perfect Storm (Low Probability, High Impact)

Scenario overview

Tricolor's collapse serves as the "Bear Stearns Moment" in the subprime consumer credit market. The process spreads rapidly, and investors begin to question not only car loan ABS, but also unsecured consumer loan ABS and other exotic securitized products. This credit market panic is directly synchronized with US Treasury market stress on the Night of Valpurgis around September 30th.

Possible impact

A full-scale liquidity crisis arises. Spreads for all securities except the most liquid government bonds will expand rapidly. A flight to quality overwhelms the handling capacity of the US Treasury market, forcing Fed intervention (e.g., providing emergency liquidity facilities). All new issuing markets except for the highest quality borrowers will freeze completely. This scenario corresponds to a true systemic event.

Indicators to monitor

HY OAS's sudden rise exceeded 400-500 basis points. Expansion of spreads in other ABS sectors (consumer loans, credit cards, etc.). Signs of stress in the commercial paper and repo markets. Emergency meeting of the Fed.

Table 3: Scenario Analysis Matrix

D. Recommendations for Action Plans

Immediate action

1. Complete Resolution of Exposure: In particular, all exposure to subprime car loans ABS issued by small non-bank originators will be eliminated.

2. Scrutiny of assets held: A detailed examination of bonds and equity holdings of local banks involved in warehouse lending to non-bank financial institutions.

3. Performing hedges: Purchase short-term protection of high yield credit indexes (e.g. put options for HYG, JNK) as a cheap hedge against the current complementary (complacency) in the market.

Strategic Positioning

1. Monitoring ABS spreads: If spreads begin to expand beyond the subprime auto loan sector, it is an important signal that is increasing the likelihood of scenario 2 or 3.

2. Dynamics monitoring of "The Night of Valpurgis": Pay close attention to the outcomes of US Treasury bids towards the end of the quarter and dealer positioning. If there are indications of market dysfunction, we should move to a broader "risk-off" position.

3. Identifying opportunities: Market overreactions could create a good buy opportunity if the spreads of quality Prime Automotive Loan ABS (e.g. Ford Credit, issued by Toyota Financial) expand in conjunction with the subprime sector. The important thing is to distinguish between fraud among individual companies and deterioration in trust across sectors.

Cited literature

1\. Fraud Claims Trip Up Tricolor And Rattle Big Banks \- Finimize, https://finimize.com/content/fraud-claims-trip-up-tricolor-and-rattle-big-banks 2\. Market Chatter: JPMorgan, Barclays Limit Trading of Tricolor's Asset-Backed Securities, https://www.moomoo.com/news/post/58359607/market-chatter-jpmorgan-barclays-limit-trading-of-tricolor-s-asset 3\. US High Yield Master II Option-Adjusted Spread (Market Dail…, https://ycharts.com/indicators/us\ high\ yield\ master\ ii\ optionadjusted\ spread 4\. US High Yield B Option-Adjusted Spread (Market Daily) \- Uni… \- YCharts, https://ycharts.com/indicators/us\ high\ yield\ b\ optionadjusted\ spread 5\. KBRA Places All Outstanding TAST Ratings on Watch Downgrade, https://www.kbra.com/publications/SvyhcyVK/kbra-places-all-outstanding-tast-ratings-on-watch-downgrade 6\. Tricolor bankruptcy sparks fraud probes, banks face heavy losses, https://news.dealershipguy.com/p/tricolor-bankruptcy-sparks-fraud-probes-banks-face-heavy-losses-2025-09-11 7\. Tricolor Closes $217 Million Securitization to Empower Underserved Communities at Scale, https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2025/06/11/3097476/0/en/Tricolor-Closes-217-Million-Securitization-to-Empower-Underserved-Communities-at-Scale.html 8\. Tricolor Closes $328 Million Securitization to Advance Financial Inclusion at Scale in Underserved Communities \- GlobeNewswire, https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2025/03/12/3041304/0/en/Tricolor-Closes-328-Million-Securitization-to-Advance-Financial-Inclusion-at-Scale-in-Underserved-Communities.html 9\. Major Subprime Auto Lender Files For Bankruptcy Amid Fraud Allegations | iHeart, https://www.iheart.com/content/2025-09-12-major-subprime-auto-lender-files-for-bankruptcy-amid-fraud-allegations/ 10\. Tricolor auto loan fiasco puts ABS practices on trial \- Global Capital, https://www.globalcapital.com/securitization/article/2fbeje0o3m6vmzwquc9a8/securitization/abs-us/tricolor-auto-abs-fiasco-puts-market-systems-on-trial 11\. Tricolor Auto's Sudden Bankruptcy Jolts Subprime Market \- BadCredit.org, https://www.badcredit.org/news/tricolor-autos-sudden-bankruptcy-jolts-subprime-market/ 12\. Tricolor Files for Bankruptcy. The Auto Lender Was Once an ESG Favorite. \-- Barrons.com, https://www.moomoo.com/news/post/58313309/tricolor-files-for-bankruptcy-the-auto-lender-was-once-an 13\. Tricolor Secures $90 Million from Funds Managed by BlackRock to Expand AI-Powered Responsible Lending Platform for Underserved Consumers \- GlobeNewswire, https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2021/09/09/2294113/0/en/Tricolor-Secures-90-Million-from-Funds-Managed-by-BlackRock-to-Expand-AI-Powered-Responsible-Lending-Platform-for-Underserved-Consumers.html 14\. Tricolor Social Bond Framework-September 2023, https://www.tricolorholdings.com/pdf/investors/Tricolor\ Social\ Bond\ Framework.pdf 15\. From the editor: Tricolor downfall could ripple through industry for some time | Auto Remarketing, https://www.autoremarketing.com/bhph/from-the-editor-tricolor-downfall-could-ripple-through-industry-for-some-time/ 16\. Texas Auto Dealer Will Pay More Than $82000 To Settle FTC Charges It Violated Fair Credit Reporting Act, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2015/09/texas-auto-dealer-will-pay-more-82000-settle-ftc-charges-it-violated-fair-credit-reporting-act 17\. Tricolor Bankruptcy Jolts Auto ABS; JPM FITB on Alert | NAI 500, https://nai500.com/blog/2025/09/tricolor-bankruptcy-jolts-auto-abs-jpm-fitb-on-alert/ 18\. KBRA Assigns Preliminary Ratings to Tricolor Auto Securitization Trust 2025-1, https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20250305014211/en/KBRA-Assigns-Preliminary-Ratings-to-Tricolor-Auto-Securitization-Trust-2025-1 19\. KBRA Assigns Ratings to Tricolor Auto Securitization Trust 2025-2, https://www.kbra.com/publications/WYLVLYwz/kbra-assigns-ratings-to-tricolor-auto-securitization-trust-2025-2 20\. Moody's, KBRA put Tricolor auto ABS on downgrade watch \- Asset Securitization Report, https://asreport.americanbanker.com/news/after-ch-7-filing-tricolor-auto-abs-on-downgrade-watch 21\. Tricolor Auto ABS ratings at risk of downgrade amid bankruptcy \- Auto Finance News, https://www.autofinancenews.net/allposts/capital-funding/tricolor-auto-abs-ratings-at-risk-of-downgrade-amid-bankruptcy/ 22\. Ratings.Moodys.com/primary, https://ratings.moodys.com/primary 23\. A Big Auto Lender Went Bankrupt. Here's What It Means. \- Kelley Blue Book, https://www.kbb.com/car-news/a-big-auto-lender-went-bankrupt-heres-what-it-means/ 24\. JPMorgan, Fifth Third among banks facing Tricolor losses \- Auto Finance News, https://www.autofinancenews.net/allposts/risk-management/jpmorgan-fifth-third-among-banks-facing-tricolor-losses/ 25\. Renasant Corporation (via Public) / Regulation FD Disclosure (Form 8-K), https://www.publicnow.com/view/E6DD14B73D7A7FD92DB542767A1BBA93FC9DF045 26\. rnst-20250911 \- SEC.gov, https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/715072/000071507225000219/rnst-20250911.htm 27\. Tricolor returns to raise $223.9 million in auto loan securitization, https://asreport.americanbanker.com/news/tricolor-returns-to-raise-223-9-million-in-auto-loan-securitization 28\. Office of Public Affairs | Deutsche Bank Agrees to Pay $7.2 Billion for ..., https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/deutsche-bank-agrees-pay-72-billion-misleading-investors-its-sale-residential-mortgage-backed 29\. (PDF) Deutsche Bank, AG: Mortgage Securitization and Financial Collapse \- ResearchGate, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/330109072\ Deutsche\ Bank\ AG\ Mortgage\ Securitization\ and\ Financial\ Collapse 30\. United States \- ICE BofA US High Yield Index Option-Adjusted Spread \- 2025 Data 2026 Forecast 1996 Historical \- Trading Economics, https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/bofa-merrill-lynch-us-high-yield-option-adjusted-spread-fed-data.html 31\. U.S. Auto Loan ABS Tracker: January 2025 Performa | S\&P Global Ratings, https://www.spglobal.com/ratings/en/regulatory/article/250310-u-s-auto-loan-abs-tracker-january-2025-performance-s13441511 32\. Tricolor exit could have ripple effect on small subprime lenders \- Auto Finance News, https://www.autofinancenews.net/allposts/risk-management/tricolor-exit-could-have-ripple-effect-on-small-subprime-lenders/ 33\. Peter Cecchini on Subprime Auto Lending Risks and Abs Market Pressures | Axonic Funds, https://www.axonicfunds.com/peter-cecchini-on-subprime-auto-lending-risks-and-abs-market-pressures/ 34\. The "September Curse" in the bond market has been activated: the yield on 30-year U.S. Treasury bonds is poised to break 5%, with global long-term government bonds all declining. \- Moomoo, https://www.moomoo.com/news/post/57950169/the-september-curse-in-the-bond-market-has-been-activated 35\. The "September Curse" in the bond market has been activated: the yield on 30-year U.S. Treasury bonds is poised to break 5%, with global long-term government bonds all declining., https://news.futunn.com/en/post/61584978/the-september-curse-in-the-bond-market-has-been-activated 36\. Treasury market comes under fire as September bond supply gives investors choices, https://www.morningstar.com/news/marketwatch/20250902378/treasury-market-comes-under-fire-as-september-bond-supply-gives-investors-choices 37\. Wall Street Braces for Volatility: September Concerns, the Fed & Tariffs \- Markets.com, https://www.markets.com/za/news/wall-street-volatility-september-concerns-fed-tariffs-904-en-EU/