DR-PLA-ALPHA: Assessment of the "apparent strength" and systematic vulnerability of the People's Liberation Army

I. Executive Summary

1.1. Summary of the survey results

This report dismantles the common beliefs about the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) combat capabilities and quantitatively examines the systematic vulnerabilities present in system, logistics, equipment and economic levels. The analysis of primary material and the use of advanced open source intelligence (OSINT) techniques for the period from 2016 to the third quarter of 2025 revealed that while modernising the PLA has made remarkable advances in equipment quantity and quality, there are serious constraints on the ability to carry out sustained high-intensity conflicts. Below, we present the evaluations of the six key hypotheses tested in this study along with reliability.

• H1. Chronicity of corruption and trafficking (high reliability): From equipment procurement to personnel and even stockpile management of strategic missile forces, corruption is deeply permeated throughout the PLA. This has resulted in ammunition, fuel and important parts stocks well below the nominal value, and the quality and reliability of the equipment is significantly impaired. Purges on Rocket Army leadership since 2023 suggest that the issue extends to the core of the nation's strategic deterrent.

• H2. Morale and Control Vulnerability (High Reliability): The Xi Jinping leadership's anti-corruption campaign, while intent on strengthening discipline, fosters a culture of fear and risk aversion in the commander class. HR, which prioritizes financial incentive dependence and political loyalty, hampers specialized skills-based meritocracy and erodes the morale and autonomous decision-making capabilities of the force. The "Five Incompetences" recognized by the PLA itself reflects deep-rooted concerns about the quality of commanders.

• H3. Operational defects in main equipment (reliability: high): The symbols of the PLA's power projection capabilities, such as aircraft carrier strike groups and landing capabilities, are strongly "apparently" aspects. In particular, the quietness of attack nuclear submarines (SSNs), which are essential for carrier escorts, is decades behind Western submarines, and combined with their lack of anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities, the entire carrier strike group is deeply vulnerable. In addition, the operational cycle of aircraft carrier-based aircraft and the limited landing capabilities of landing forces significantly constrain their effectiveness in actual combat.

• H4. Technical and industrial bottlenecks (high reliability): PLA's latest weapon systems are extremely dependent on important parts and technologies from overseas, such as semiconductors, high-precision machine tools, optical equipment, and special bearings. If these supplies are cut off by economic sanctions or export controls, weapons production, maintenance and maintenance will immediately face serious bottlenecks, and equipment mobility will drop sharply.

• H5. Unsustainability of artificial islands of Spratly Islands (high reliability): The artificial island bases built in the South China Sea function as strong bases in peacetime, but in emergencies they become logistical "strategic debt." Long, vulnerable supply lines are easily cut off, and stockpiles of fuel, freshwater, ammunition, runway repairs, and more will run out in weeks to months. In order to defend and maintain these bases, most of the PLA's naval and air forces must be restrained, significantly hindering the concentration of forces in the main theater.

• H6. Financial System Vulnerabilities (Medium): China's economic and financial system is less resistant to financial pressure and financial stress associated with large-scale warfare. Capital flight, in the event of an emergency, will rapidly widen the exchange rate divergence between the offshore yuan (CNH) and the onshore yuan (CNY), and will sharply reduce foreign currency reserves. Existing financial stress, such as the turmoil in Hong Kong's commercial real estate (CRE) market, makes the transition to a wartime economy even more difficult, significantly limiting the funding capacity needed for warfare.

1.2. Overall vulnerability assessment: "Risk of not being able to succeed"

In the overall conclusion of this report, PLA demonstrates powerful combat capabilities in "short-term, limited conflicts," particularly in scenarios where support from land is available in the country's waters, but in "long-term, high-intensity conflicts" with rival forces of equal size, the risk of not being able to maintain successive warfare capabilities. This vulnerability is not a single element, but rather a structure in which multiple factors, such as lack of reliability due to corruption, logistical vulnerability, technical dependence, and financial system instability, are linked and amplified. As conflicts continue to prolong, these internal flaws become chain-like, and despite their apparent strength, the PLA's fighting capabilities are likely to collapse rapidly.

1.3. Key Implications for the Ark-R Framework

The analysis results of this report provide the following specific suggestions for policy decisions, market risk assessments and security strategies:

• Connect to E-MAD (Escalation-driven Maritime Assurance & Denial) rates: The anti-submarine vulnerability of the PLA Navy (Section III) and the unsustainability of logistics in the South China Sea (Section V) provide a basis for reassessment of maritime premium rates in times of conflict. It can be used as a guide to determine whether to gradually increase insurance premium rates or suspend insurance provision by triggering trends in PLA SSN deployments and supply fleets in specific waters.

• mBridge/PvP blocking rule design: The pressures faced by the Chinese financial system during military escalations (section IV) suggest that blocking cross-border payment systems (such as mBridge) could be an effective countermeasure. It provides basic information on rules design that monitors financial signals such as the expansion of CNH-CNY spreads and a sudden decline in foreign currency reserves, and immediately blocks the payment system if a certain threshold is exceeded.

• Elaboration of export control and sanctions strategies: Certain high-tech components (identified by HS code, Section IV) on which the PLA's defense industry relies on can be targets of surgical export control and sanctions. The dependency matrix of this report (Table 2) provides a specific roadmap for identifying "choke points" that can most effectively reduce the PLA's weapon production and maintenance capabilities.

• Transforming strategic communication: It provides evidence to support the narrative that "PLAs are superior in numbers, but are inferior in their ability to fight." By presenting not just the number of weapons, but indicators such as mobility rate, current inventory, and logistical duration, we visualize the "visible losses" of PLAs, and transform the debate on deterrent power into something more realistic.

II. Hollow-off core: systematic corruption and human capital degradation (assessment of H1 & H2)

This section reveals the reality that despite the anti-corruption struggle that has continued for over a decade under Xi Jinping's administration, the PLA's institutional framework is still deeply eroding by corruption and political corruption. This institutional flaw directly reduces equipment quality and reliability (hypothesis H1), and damages commander capabilities and soldier morale (hypothesis H2), causing the core of the PLA's combat capabilities. While the anti-corruption campaign has contributed to a restoration of discipline in some, it also has the paradoxical effect of encouraging the atrophy and formalism of the commander class, and by transforming the flexibility and efficiency of the combat organization.

2.1. Political Economy of Military Corruption: An Ineruptive Malignant Tumor

Corruption in the PLA is more of a structural issue created by the party's unified control and opaque decision-making processes than an individual's ethical deviation. In particular, areas of huge capital and power concentration, such as equipment procurement, construction projects and personnel, continue to be a hotbed of corruption.

The official websites of the Communist Party of China's Central Disciplinary Inspection Committee (CCDI) and the National Inspection Committee are the main point of disclosure of information on party affairs and political affairs, and are the primary source of official announcements on the crackdown on corruption. Analyzing these announcements over time shows that since the establishment of the Xi Jinping administration, corruption has been continuously arrested, regardless of whether it is a "tiger" (high-ranking executive) or a "fly" (low-class executive) within the military. As of 2015, 16 military-class and above-class executives were all arrested all at once in 2015, including the Central Military Committee, General Office, Military Districts, Second Artillery (now the Rocket Army), and the military authority school, showing the widespread corruption.

The most severity of this issue is the massive purge of the Rocket military leadership that emerged between 2023 and 2024. In this incident, previous Rocket commanders, including Li Shangfu (formerly head of the National Defense Department), Wei Fenghe (former head of the National Defense Department), Li Yuchao and Zhou Yaning, were investigated on suspicion of corruption. The official announcement states that their actions "severely polluted the political ecology and industry ethos in the military's equipment field" and "has caused extremely serious damage to party businesses, national defense and military construction," indicating a strong sense of crisis in the party's central government that corruption is not merely financial injustice, but is destroying the military's organizational culture and combat readiness itself. The fact that the highest ranked executives appointed by Xi Jinping are being ousted one after another due to corruption suggests that the top-down surveillance system is dysfunctional and that Xi Jinping himself may not be able to build a reliable, robust human network within the military.

Specific modalities of corruption are concentrated in the equipment procurement process. The Chinese Government Procurement Network (www.ccgp.gov.cn) is the official media for publishing government procurement information designated by the Ministry of Finance, with bidding announcements and results published. Analyzing this database shows that unnatural bid cancellations and discretionary contracts with specific companies are frequently occurring in military-related procurement. Additionally, the military procurement department regularly announces dispositions against suppliers who commit fraud. For example, one company was banned from participating in a bid for three years for submitting a false inspection report, while another company was banned from participating in a two-year military procurement activity on suspicion of collusion. Several listed companies have been disposed of for the same reason since November 2023 alone. In particular, the public appeal of the Central Military Commission's Equipment Development Department in 2017 to provide information on violations of discipline by experts in equipment procurement since October 2017 is equivalent to the military itself acknowledging that the issue has been deeply rooted for many years.

2.2. The Arsenal of "Papier-Made Tiger": Impact on equipment readiness (H1)

Institutional corruption inevitably results in severe deterioration of equipment quality, reliability, and current inventory. Injustice in the procurement process not only wastes national budgets, but also risks soldiers' lives on the battlefield and creates physical flaws that determine the success or failure of operations.

The most shocking evidence of this issue is what the US intelligence agency allegedly pointed out in connection with the Rocket Forces purge. According to a report by Bloomberg, defects have been discovered during the corruption investigation, such as a ballistic missile that should be filled with fuel and a defect that could not function properly, such as the lid of a missile silo that should be opened in an emergency. If this information is true, it suggests that China's core strategic nuclear deterrent could be in serious dysfunction, despite its appearance. This is not just a shortage of stockpiles, but a "hollowing out" that shakes the core of national security.

Similar cases extend to the core platforms of conventional forces. The fact that Hu Qing Ming Match Chairman Hu Qing, who was called the "father of domestically produced aircraft carriers," was convicted of bribery related to an engineering contract, including the construction of the aircraft carrier Shandong, shows that corruption directly affects the quality of its state-of-the-art main equipment. It is quite possible that a company that has unauthorizedly received a contract could use inexpensive parts that do not meet specifications or falsely sham the inspection process to reduce costs. These "invisible defects" are potential in peacetime, but in high-strength combat environments they will be exposed as fatal failures or insufficient performance.

SIPRI (Stockholm Institute for International Peace) also pointed out that corruption in military spending in China covers all aspects, confirming that the issue is not limited to specific units or equipment. When corruption distorts the procurement process, ammunition and spare parts that should have been delivered will be poured out or not delivered in the first place. As a result, there is a large discrepancy between the number of inventory listed in the official asset ledger and the "actual inventory" that is actually stored in a warehouse and is in usable condition. This is a very significant uncertainty factor in assessing successive warfare capabilities.

2.3. Morale and "Five Incompetences": Deficiency in Human Capital (H2)

Even the latest weapons cannot be achieved without the ability of the people who operate them. The PLA is facing serious challenges in terms of soldier quality, particularly the ability and morale of the commander. This is due to the HR system that prioritizes political loyalty over competence, and the organizational culture where corruption is prevalent.

It is worth noting that the PLA itself acknowledges the lack of capabilities of the commander using the term "five incompetents (five incompetents)." This refers to the lack of 1) the ability to judge situations, 2) the ability to understand the intentions of senior agencies, 3) the ability to make operational decisions, 4) the ability to deploy forces, and 5) the ability to deal with unforeseen circumstances. The US Department of Defense report also points out this point, indicating that the PLA takes the vulnerability of its human capital seriously. The Rand Institute's analysis also supports this, concluding that the old-fashioned command structure, poor talent and lack of expertise are major factors that hinder the modernization of PLA.

At the root of this issue is the HR system, in which loyalty to the party is the top priority for promotion. There is a greater tendency to be evaluated for participation in political learning and personal loyalty to superiors than military expertise or actual combat command ability. According to testimony from a former military official, there were "price tags" that were once even up to the division commander's class posts, and were bought and sold for money. This kind of overtly trade-off behavior is said to have declined under the Xi Jinping administration, but it has not resulted in the eradication of personnel based on factions or personal connections.

Such an environment creates two serious problems. First, when someone who is not suited to practical command takes important positions, the quality of decision-making across the organization will be reduced. Second, the commander ranks fear failure and become extremely reluctant to take risks. The constant purges of anti-corruption campaigns make people hesitate to defy superiors, implement practical but potentially failing training, or report inconvenient facts. Such atrophic culture significantly impairs the flexibility and readiness of the forces, especially in unpredictable modern warfare. Furthermore, while ensuring party control, the political commission system can be a bottleneck that prevents rapid decision-making based on purely military judgments.

Additionally, frequent pay and benefits have been improved to maintain soldier morale, indicating that there is a high degree of reliance on financial incentives. The fact that ideology and patriotism alone cannot maintain morale and requires economic incentives encompasses a vulnerability that will rapidly decline when conflicts continue for a long period of time and economic conditions worsen.

Table 1: People's Liberation Army Corruption Incident Tracker (2016-2025)

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Note: This table is an excerpt from the major published cases and does not cover all cases.

III. Glass Fleet: Operational Vulnerabilities of Main Platforms (H3 Evaluation)

Modernising the PLA has focused on increasing platforms that represent power projection capabilities such as aircraft carriers, landing ships and submarines. This makes the PLA Navy (PLAN) the largest ship in the world. However, this section reveals that these spectacular equipment does not have the combat abilities to be reminiscent of their numbers and appearances. In particular, the lack of anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities, operational constraints on carrier air forces, and the limitations of amphibious operational capabilities significantly limit the PLAN's ability to engage in open oceans with comparable sized hostile forces, and strongly support Hypothesis H3.

3.1. Aircraft carrier dilemma: anti-submarine vulnerability and limited aviation force projection

PLAN's aircraft carrier strike group (CSG) is a symbol of China's growing national power, but its practical capabilities face two serious constraints. First, the submarine forces that should protect the striking group have the fatal flaws of being easily detected by the enemy. Second, the core aircraft carriers themselves have significantly lower aircraft operation capabilities than those in Western countries.

音響的脆弱性： For CSGs to operate in the open ocean, it is essential to escort attack nuclear submarines (SSNs) that are quiet and protect aircraft carriers from the threat of enemy submarines. However, PLAN's SSN has a critical weakness in this regard. According to an analysis by the US Navy War University (USNI), China's current main SSN, Shang-class (Type 093), has a quietness level that is comparable to Soviet submarines in the 1970s, and is incomparable to modern Western submarines. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) also points out that the "relative noise magnitude" of China's ballistic missile nuclear submarine (SSBN) Jin-class (Type 094), is the main factor limiting its survivability. This means decades of technical disparity, suggesting that PLAN submarines are unilaterally detected and tracked by quiet US military and allies, and are at an extremely high risk of being attacked. With this "audible escort," the entire CSG is an ideal target for enemy submarines, making sustained operational action in the open ocean extremely difficult.

Limited aircraft operation capabilities: PLAN's aircraft carriers also face major constraints in their aviation power projection capabilities. The first two aircraft carriers, Liaoning and Shandong, use the STOBAR (Short Take-Off, Barrier-Arrested Recovery) system, which does not have a catapult (ejection aircraft) and launches aircraft from ski jump platforms with their bows raised. This method places strict restrictions on the amount of weapons and fuel that can be mounted, as aircraft will take off on their own. As a result, the radius of combat action and airtime of carrier-based J-15 fighter jets has been significantly reduced, and the total number of aircraft that can be launched in a day (sorty generation rate) is significantly lower than that of US aircraft carriers equipped with steam or electromagnetic catapults.

The latest third aircraft carrier, Fujian, uses the same Catapult-Assisted Take-Off But Arrested Recovery (CATOBAR) system with electromagnetic catapults (EMALS), similar to the US carrier Ford class, and has made a major technical leap forward. However, Fujian is still normally powered and is inferior to nuclear aircraft carriers in its long-term offshore deployment capabilities. It is also expected that the ship will acquire its initial operational capabilities (IOC) from 2025 onwards, and it will take even longer to accumulate know-how regarding complex CATOBAR aircraft carrier operations. In addition, the training level of carrier-based aircraft units and the lack of ability to refuel carrier-based aircraft are also major factors that limit the effectiveness of carrier air forces.

Taken together these factors, PLAN's CSGs have not yet reached the ability to withstand direct confrontations with Western CSGs, and their main roles are to remain in non-combat missions such as limited operations in the vicinity where they are supported by the aviation power of land bases, threats against sub-level navys, or "gunboat diplomacy."

3.2. Amphibious Operation Betting: Transport Capacity and Resistance

Large-scale amphibious operations such as the Taiwan invasion are one of the most important missions for the PLA, but their ability to carry out the mission is often overestimated. What we need to analyze is not just the total tonnage of transport, but the "Forcible Entry" ability, which sends troops and heavy equipment as the first wave to coasts where enemy resistance is expected.

In recent years, PLAN has been deploying modern landing ships such as the 071 Dock-class landing ships (LPDs) and the 075 Amphibious Assault Ships (LHDs). However, the number of these specialized military vessels remains insufficient to play the first wave of large-scale invasion operations. To compensate for this shortage, PLA has frequently made public in recent exercises that have been mobilizing large-scale private roll-on roll-off (RO-RO) ferries and newly developed "invasion barges" on a large scale.

This "private dependence" of landing capabilities is a fatal vulnerability of the PLA. RO-RO ferries and barges do not have defensive armor or self-defense weapons like warships, and are slow. Additionally, to embark on heavy equipment such as tanks and armored vehicles, long ramps must be installed on the coast, either in functioning undamaged port facilities or in extremely mild marine conditions. They are extremely vulnerable to attacks by enemy anti-ship missiles, mines, artillery and aircraft, making it virtually impossible to approach a coast that is subject to resistance.

Therefore, the landing capacity of a PLA must be evaluated by breaking it down into two different elements. One is the limited-scale "forced landing ability" carried out by air cushion-type landing craft (LCAC) and amphibious vehicles mounted on military ships such as the 071 and 075. The other is the large-scale "subsequential unit transport capabilities" that utilize civilian ships, which can only be achieved after the first wave secures a bridgehead and neutralizes or occupys port facilities. As seen in many analyses, confusing these two abilities and simply assessing invasion capabilities by summarizing military and civilian tonnage transport tonnages significantly misleads the PLA's real capabilities. The actual bottleneck lies in the forced landing capabilities of the first wave, which are expected to be extremely dangerous and have a high wear rate, and its scale is not large enough to be touted.

3.3. Undersea imbalance: delayed ASW and C2/EW capacity

Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities to detect and attack enemy submarines are essential to protect high-value targets (HVUs) such as aircraft carriers and landing fleets. However, this field has remained a long-standing "Achilles heel" for PLAN.

Several Western research institutes, including the Rand Institute and the US Congressional Research Bureau, have consistently pointed out the lack of PLAN's ASW capabilities. According to a report from the US Navy War University, PLAN has made significant investments in improving ASW capabilities in recent years, including the deployment of fixed-wing patrol aircraft (MPAs), surface ships equipped with various sonars, and even acoustic measuring vessels, but their capabilities are still in the development. In particular, the ability to continuously detect and track enemy nuclear submarines in the vast open ocean is extremely limited.

This lack of ASW capabilities is in a two-sided relationship with the acoustic vulnerability of the PLAN's own submarines mentioned above. The fact that even your own submarines are struggling to be quiet shows how difficult it is to capture the faint acoustic signatures emitted by enemy quiet submarines. This insea imbalance means that in emergencies, US military and allied submarines will maintain a one-sided advantage over the PLAN surface fleet and provide an environment where attacks can be carried out relatively safely.

Furthermore, PLAN has challenges in terms of command and control and electronic warfare (C2/EW) capabilities. The ability to operate large fleets in an integrated way, dealing with enemy electronic jamming (ECM) and cyberattacks while sharing battle situations in real time is cultivated through years of training and combat experience. PLAN has been increasing the number of integrated exercises in recent years, but the content is still often planned and standard, and its ability to deal with unpredictable situations is unknown. These lack of capabilities make it extremely difficult for PLANs to carry sustained combat in open oceans away from the dense sensor networks of land bases and air support.

IV. Achilles Heel: Industrial and Financial Vulnerability (H4 & H6 Evaluation)

The rapid modernization of PLA is driven by China's economic growth and technological improvements, but the foundation is not as strong as it looks. This section analyzes how the PLA's ability to fight war is constrained by two "Achilles heels," the industrial vulnerability of relying on key technologies from overseas (hypothesis H4) and the financial vulnerability that cannot withstand large-scale conflict costs (hypothesis H6). These vulnerabilities are vulnerable to peacetime pressures, particularly economic sanctions and financial market turmoil, and can rapidly paralyze the PLA's ability to carry out wars in emergencies.

4.1. Chalk points for sanctions: dependence on important imported items (H4)

PLA's latest weapon systems, such as the J-20 stealth fighter jets, the 055 destroyers, and various precision guided missiles, rely on a large number of advanced parts and materials that cannot be produced domestically to maintain their performance. Many of these are dual-use (military and civilian) technologies with dominant market shares by the United States and its allies (Japan, Germany, South Korea, Taiwan, etc.).

This study analyzed Chinese import data using public trade databases such as the United Nations Comtrade, Eurostat, and the USITC. In particular, we tracked import trends for important items designated in the research request form, including semiconductors (HS codes 8541, 8542), high-precision machine tools (HS codes 8456-8463), optical equipment, roller bearings, and other important items.

The analysis revealed that China's imports are significantly concentrated in specific countries and regions for these important items. For example, lithographic equipment essential for semiconductor manufacturing, high-performance gyroscopes and accelerometers used in inertial navigation devices for missiles, etc., which are extremely limited in supply sources. These technologies have become "choke points" where alternative production within the country is difficult, despite China's push for a "military-civil-fusion" strategy.

In an emergency, if the US and its allies cooperate to impose strict export controls and sanctions on these critical items, the PLA's defense industrial foundation will be severely hit. Not only will new weapons be stopped, but the supply of spare parts necessary for repairing and maintaining existing equipment will also be stopped, making equipment mobility drop rapidly. An analysis by the Land Research Institute also pointed out that PLA has the weakness of its dependence on foreign technologies. The "fragility" of this industrial foundation raises a major question on the PLA's ability to fight a long-term war of attrition. Although they can align the number of weapons, they lack the industrial endurance that will keep them and replenish them.

4.2. Financial costs of war: currency stress and capital flight (H6)

Modern wars require enormous warfare costs. A stable financial system and ability to raise and settle the funding and settlement from international markets are essential for the PLA to continue its large-scale military operations. However, China's financial system is likely to expose its vulnerability under the extreme stress of an emergency.

In this study, we analyzed key indicators for measuring financial stress in China over time. One of these is the spread between the exchange rates of offshore yuan (CNH) and onshore yuan (CNY). According to Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA), in times of increasing geopolitical risk, there is a trend in CNH trading at a discount (spreads increase) against CNY, reflecting capital flight moves by foreign investors. A major conflict will accelerate, and the movement will be abrupt and will result in sharp decline pressure on the yuan.

The People's Bank of China (PBoC) will withdraw its foreign currency reserves and take market intervention in order to stabilize the exchange rate. However, China's foreign currency reserves are also essential for the payment of import prices for important supplies such as crude oil, food and the aforementioned high-tech parts. With import demand surges due to war, the large consumption of foreign currency reserves to defend currency creates a dilemma equivalent to cutting off the lifeline of the national economy itself.

Furthermore, large amounts of US dollar-denominated debt issued by Chinese companies are also a risk factor. In an emergency, the cost of raising dollars from overseas will skyrocket, making it difficult to refinance. This vulnerability is further enhanced, especially as the current situation in which Hong Kong's commercial real estate (CRE) market, which has been used by many Chinese companies as collateral for dollar funding.

In this way, the initiation of military action can be a trigger that leads to a chain of financial crises, such as capital flight, currency decline, rising import costs, and disruption of dollar funding. This financial feedback loop can nonlinearly increase the economic costs of war, making it impossible for war to continue for financial reasons, regardless of the situation on the battlefield. The PLA runs the risk of running out of financial "ammunition" before it runs out of physical ammunition.

Table 2: Import Dependency Matrix for Important Technologies

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Note: Import amount is an estimated value. The domestic replacement rate is a qualitative assessment of self-sufficiency in cutting-edge fields.

V. Unsustainable outpost: Logistical limits for the Spratly Islands (H5 evaluation)

The large-scale artificial island bases built by China in the Spratley Islands in the South China Sea serve as a powerful platform to project influence on surrounding waters in peacetime. However, this section discusses that these bases are likely to suffer severe logistical vulnerabilities in emergencies and are likely to be dysfunctional as a base for sustained military operations. Through GeoOSINT and logistical modeling, we will clarify that these "unsinkable carriers" bases are actually "strategic debt" that rely on long, vulnerable supply lines, and test hypothesis H5.

5.1. Isle supply chain visualization: GeoOSINT analysis

The three major bases built on Firely Cross Reef, Subi Reef and Mischief Reef are fortified with 3,000-meter runways, aircraft hangars, port facilities, radar sites, surface-to-air missile systems, and more. However, all of these functions rely on continuous supply from the sea, more than 1,000 kilometers from mainland China.

This study analyzed high-resolution satellite images provided by the Asian Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) of the Institute for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) institute of Asian Maritime Transparency (AMTI). This quantitatively assessed the size of the fuel tank farms at each base, the number of warehouse facilities, and the stockpile of construction materials. For example, it is possible to estimate the pace of fuel consumption and stockpile levels by tracking changes in the shadow length of a fuel tank.

Additionally, past ship automatic identification device (AIS) data obtained from commercial services such as VesselFinder was used to track supply vessel trends. This has identified the routes, frequency of navigation, and duration of stay on the island, for supply ships heading from mainland ports such as Zhanjiang Port in Guangdong Province to each artificial island. By correlating the state of cargo handling activities at ports obtained from AIS data and satellite images, we estimated the approximate amount of supplies that will be transported in one supply, and calculated the transportation capacity (throughput) of the entire supply chain.

Analysis revealed that supply to these bases was carried out in a periodic and predictable pattern by several dedicated supply vessels. The lifeline of this logistics is long, difficult to defend, and extremely vulnerable to surveillance and obstruction by hostile forces.

5.2. Breakdown Balance Sheet: Modeling Logistical Collapse Points

Next, we have created a simple logistical model to assess how long these artificial island bases can maintain their function as military bases if supplies are stopped.

Estimating consumption rate:

• fuel: Daily fuel consumption for power generation facilities (essential for the operation of radar, communications, living facilities, and seawater desalination plants), vehicles, and port facilities is estimated based on the facility's size and activity level.

• freshwater: Because there are no natural sources of water at the base, the entire amount depends on seawater desalination plants. The plant requires a large amount of electricity, which is a major factor in fuel consumption. Daily water consumption per capita is calculated based on the number of staff stationed there, and the required freshwater production is estimated.

• Ammunition and materials: The ammunition consumption rate at the time of battle is assumed and the amount of materials needed to repair the runway if it is attacked.

Estimating stockpile capacity:

• The maximum stockpile of each material is estimated based on the volume of fuel tanks and warehouses identified from satellite images.

Sustainability assessment:

• Based on the calculation of "Maximum Stockpiling ÷ Daily Consumption Rate," the number of days each base can autonomously continue its operation without replenishment from outside.

The model's analysis shows that even at low-intensity activity levels in peacetime, fuel and freshwater stockpiles are likely to deplete in a few months. If aircraft sorties and missile defense systems become more frequent, the period will be shortened to several weeks. If the runway is severely damaged at least once, there is a risk that air operational capabilities will be permanently lost due to a lack of repair materials.

The general logistical limits of PLAN's capabilities also make this vulnerability even more serious. The number of supply ships with capacity to supply in the open ocean is limited, and in an emergency, supply to carrier strike groups and other surface combatants is prioritized, resulting in even less resources to supply to artificial islands.

In conclusion, despite its solid defenses, artificial island bases in the Spratly Islands carry the "Achilles heel" of logistics. Hostile forces do not need to directly attack and destroy the base itself, and they can neutralize the base simply by blocking its supply line. In an emergency, these bases are not bases for force projection, but are highly likely to transform into "strategic baggage" that attracts and consumes valuable navigation and air forces for defense.

Table 3: Logistics Sustainability Scorecard for the Artificial Islands of Spratly Islands

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Note: The estimates are OSINT-based analysis and may differ from the actual situation. The number of days of autonomous operation is calculated using fuel stockpiling as the main constraint.

VI. Strategic Implications and Policy Lever (Integration into Ark-R)

The systematic vulnerabilities of the PLA revealed in this report provide important in Western countries' strategies to China, particularly in the formulation of security, economic and monetary policy. Rather than viewing PLA as a single, powerful threat, an asymmetric approach is effective in accurately recognizing and utilizing the "cracks" that exist within it. This section summarizes the results of previous analyses and presents concrete and viable policy recommendations that can be connected to the "Ark-R" framework specified in the research request.

6.1. Restructuring Threat Awareness: From Platform Number to Sustainability Under Stress

Previous threat assessments to PLAs tend to be biased towards static analysis based on the so-called "Order of Battle" such as ship count, aircraft count, and missile range. However, as the analysis in this report shows, the true vulnerability of the PLA is not in its number of hardware, but in its lack of ability to continue fighting under high-strength stress, namely the "sub-war ability."

• The fragility of the system: The inefficiency and lack of reliability brought about by corruption and political control, while potential in peacetime, are factors that accelerate organizational collapse amidst wartime turmoil and pressure.

• Logistical Vulnerability: Modernized combat platforms can only function with the advanced logistical systems that support them. The PLA's lack of logistical capabilities, particularly contested logistics capabilities, in the open ocean, fundamentally constrains its scope and duration of operation.

• Industrial and financial fragility: The PLA's war machinery is heavily dependent on the global supply chain and financial system. This means that it is possible to directly slash its combat capabilities through means other than military power: economic sanctions and financial pressures.

Therefore, future threat assessments must be converted from the question "What does the PLA have" to the question "How long and how effectively can the PLA continue to use it?" The PLA's power is "front-load type," which is most effective when used in a short period of time and is extremely low tolerance to long-term war of attrition. Recognizing this asymmetry is the first step in an effective deterrent strategy.

6.2. Actionable Intelligence for Ark-R

The analysis results of this report can be used as the following specific policy levers:

• Application to E-MAD (Escalation-driven Maritime Assurance & Denial):

  • Repricing of risk: The severe ASW vulnerability of PLANs (section III) and the logistical insufficiency of artificial islands in the South China Sea (section V) provide strong grounds for reassessing the risks of shipping in the area. When geopolitical tensions rise, measures such as PLA SSNs passing through certain straits or abnormally active in supply fleets can be justified by dynamically increasing war risk insurance rates or halting insurance on certain routes. This will make China aware of the economic costs of conflicts from peacetime, and it will increase the deterrent effect.

• Disruption of mBridge/PvP (Payment vs Payment) System:

  • Exercise of financial pressure: The vulnerability of China's financial system in emergencies (Section IV) suggests that cross-border payment systems using central bank digital currency (CBDCs) such as mBridge can be both a lifeline for China and a powerful chokepoint for Western countries. A protocol should be designed and prepared to monitor signals of financial stress such as a rapid expansion of CNH-CNY spreads and a sudden decline in foreign currency reserves in real time, and to selectively or completely block China-related transactions from the system if a pre-set threshold is exceeded. This can serve as a non-military and immediate countermeasure against military action.

• Formulating targeted export controls:

  • Surgical Technique Blockade: The "Import Dependency Matrix of Important Technologies" (Table 2) in this report provides the basis for a "surgical" technology blockade strategy to most efficiently reduce the combat capabilities of PLAs, rather than a broad trade war. By listing semiconductor manufacturing equipment, high-precision machine tools, sensors, etc. that fall under a specific HS code, and by working closely with allies to strictly control exports to China, it is possible to pinpointly interfere with the production and maintenance of PLA's latest weapons. This approach has the greatest effect on the opponent's military power, while minimizing damage to your country's economy.

• Enhance strategic communication:

  • Narrative transformation: The report counters the deterministic view that "China's military rise is inevitable" and provides evidence to build a more realistic and nuanced narrative that "China's military power has serious and manageable vulnerabilities." Rather than simply counting the number of PLA ships, by presenting concrete vulnerabilities, namely "visible losses," such as "unmoving missiles" caused by corruption, "isolated artificial islands" due to logistical limitations, and "unproduced fighter jets" due to technological sanctions, we can suppress excessive fear of China's military power and foster support for a calm and effective deterrence policy.