Global Nuclear Usability Report 2025: The Transition from MAD to Mutually Assured Self-destruction (MAS)

Executive Summary

This report presents a quantitative, open-source assessment of the operational usability of global nuclear arsenals, arguing that the classic paradigm of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) is fracturing. The core finding is that for several key state pairings, the strategic balance is transitioning toward Mutually Assured Self-destruction (MAS). MAS is a condition where the technical unreliability, operational brittleness, or political vulnerability of a state's nuclear forces makes their use an act of national suicide with no guarantee of successful retaliation.

The primary drivers of this MAD-to-MAS shift are multifaceted:

• Operational Decay: Aging systems, particularly evident in Russia's liquid-fueled Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) force, are creating a high probability of catastrophic launch failures, turning strategic assets into domestic liabilities.

• Asymmetric Vulnerabilities: Critical single points of failure undermine the credibility of second-strike capabilities. Notable examples include the questionable viability of China's sea-based deterrent due to high acoustic signatures and the United Kingdom's singular political dependency on its Scottish naval base.

• Radical Transparency: The proliferation of commercial Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) capabilities, from high-revisit satellite imagery to signals intelligence proxies, makes second-strike forces—especially submarines and mobile missiles—more vulnerable to tracking, eroding the certainty and survivability required for MAD.

• Regional Instability: In dyads such as India-Pakistan, the threshold for conventional conflict under the nuclear umbrella is dangerously low. This is amplified by external stressors like climate change, making any nuclear use immediately self-destructive for both parties, regardless of the outcome.

To quantify this shift, this report introduces the CUS (Capability-Usability-Sustainability) Index, a new framework for evaluating nuclear postures. The analysis culminates in a MAS/MAD Heatmap, which visualizes the stability of key strategic pairings. The report concludes with top-level policy recommendations designed to navigate this new, more fragile strategic environment, emphasizing reliability and stability over sheer numbers.

Part I: A New Paradigm for Deterrence Assessment

Chapter 1: From Assured Destruction to Assured Self-destruction

The strategic logic that governed the Cold War was Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). It was a stable, if terrifying, state of deterrence predicated on a simple premise: both superpowers possessed a guaranteed ability to absorb a nuclear first strike and still deliver a devastating retaliatory second strike. This assurance of retaliation, rooted in robust, survivable, and reliable second-strike forces like ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) on patrol, made all-out nuclear war unwinnable and therefore irrational.

This report argues that the foundational assumptions of MAD are eroding. The international strategic environment is transitioning toward a more unstable and perilous condition: Mutually Assured Self-destruction (MAS). MAS is defined as a state of deterrence where a nation's nuclear arsenal suffers from one or more critical flaws—be it technical unreliability, command and control (C2) vulnerability, indefensible basing, or profound political fragility. In a MAS paradigm, a presidential order to launch nuclear weapons carries a significant probability of resulting in a catastrophic failure on home territory (e.g., a silo explosion and radiological contamination), the decapitation of its own leadership before launch orders can be fully executed, or a failed retaliation that invites annihilation without a meaningful response. Under MAS, the "destruction" is no longer guaranteed to be mutual; it is, however, assuredly self-inflicted for the initiator.

The tipping point from MAD to MAS is being crossed due to a confluence of factors. First, legacy Cold War-era systems are reaching the end of their service lives, and the industrial base and institutional knowledge required to maintain or replace them have atrophied in some nations. Second, the complexity of modernization programs is leading to significant delays and failures, creating dangerous gaps in capability. Finally, the rise of ubiquitous OSINT has stripped away the cloak of oceanic or terrestrial secrecy that once protected second-strike forces, making survivability a far more challenging proposition. This new reality requires a new analytical framework to move beyond simplistic warhead counts and assess the practical, operational reality of nuclear usability.

Chapter 2: The CUS Index (Capability-Usability-Sustainability): A New Framework for Assessment

To provide a quantitative measure of an arsenal's practical utility in the modern era, this report introduces the CUS Index. This composite index is designed to evaluate a nation's nuclear posture not just on its theoretical power, but on its real-world effectiveness and long-term viability. The index is composed of three weighted pillars:

• Capability (C): This pillar measures the raw potential of an arsenal. It is the most traditional metric, encompassing warhead counts, explosive yields, and the number and range of delivery platforms (ICBMs, SLBMs, strategic bombers). While foundational, this metric is the least indicative of true strategic stability in the MAS paradigm.

• Usability (U): This pillar assesses the practical ability to employ the arsenal reliably and securely, especially under the extreme pressure of a nuclear crisis. It is the most heavily weighted component in our analysis and is broken into three sub-indices:

  • Launch Readiness (LR): Evaluates the speed and reliability of launch operations. Key factors include the ratio of solid-fueled (high readiness) to liquid-fueled (low readiness) systems, launch preparation times, and the frequency and success rate of test launches.

  • Second-Strike Assurance (SSA): Measures the survivability of retaliatory forces. This includes SSBN acoustic stealth and patrol rates, the resilience of C2 networks against physical, cyber, and electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attacks, and the effective dispersal of forces.

  • Warhead Safety & Surety (WSS): Assesses the robustness of mechanisms preventing accidental or unauthorized detonation. This includes the presence and sophistication of Permissive Action Links (PALs), one-point safety designs, and other security interlocks.

• Sustainability (S): This pillar gauges the long-term viability of the nuclear enterprise.

  • Industrial Sustainment (IS): Measures the health of the domestic industrial base, including manufacturing capacity for propellants, warhead components (e.g., plutonium pits), and delivery platforms. It also considers the stability of the supply chain and long-term budgetary allocations.

  • Political/Geographic Stability (PGS): Assesses non-military vulnerabilities. This includes internal political cohesion regarding the deterrent (e.g., the Scottish independence movement's impact on UK basing), the physical security of basing locations, and vulnerability to climate change or other geographic pressures.

The final CUS score is calculated using a proposed weighting of CUS=0.2×C+0.5×U+0.3×S. This formula deliberately emphasizes Usability as the most critical determinant of whether a nuclear deterrent is a credible backstop (MAD) or a dangerous liability (MAS) in the 21st century.

Table 1: Global CUS Index Scorecard 2025

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Part II: P5 Strategic Arsenals: A CUS Index Deep Dive

Chapter 3: The United States: The High Cost of Maintaining the Triad

The United States maintains the world's most advanced and balanced nuclear triad, earning it the highest overall CUS score. Its posture is defined by a comprehensive modernization program designed to recapitalize every leg of its deterrent: the LGM-35A Sentinel ICBM, the Columbia-class SSBN, and the B-21 Raider strategic bomber. This effort is supported by mature and sophisticated warhead safety and surety mechanisms, reflecting decades of experience and investment in negative control.

However, the primary strategic vulnerability for the U.S. deterrent is not external but internal, centered on the Sustainability pillar. The projected cost of this wholesale modernization is staggering, with the Congressional Budget Office estimating a total of $946 billion over the 2025–2034 period alone. Key programs are already facing significant budgetary and schedule pressures. The Sentinel ICBM program, for instance, has seen its projected costs rise dramatically, while the U.S. submarine industrial base is strained to produce both the new Columbia-class SSBNs and Virginia-class attack submarines simultaneously. Another critical point of concern is the Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) architecture. This vast and aging network of over 200 individual systems is the central nervous system of the deterrent, yet it faces unprecedented threats from sophisticated cyberattacks and anti-satellite weapons developed by peer competitors. Modernizing this complex system is a monumental task with its own significant costs, estimated at $154 billion through 2034.

The U.S. nuclear enterprise risks becoming a "gilded cage"—possessing immense theoretical capability but constrained by its own financial and industrial brittleness. The modernization programs are deeply interconnected and dependent on a precise timeline. A significant delay in one critical component, such as the Columbia-class submarine, could trigger a cascading failure across the entire posture. The legacy Ohio-class SSBNs cannot have their service lives extended indefinitely, and a gap in at-sea capability would severely undermine the most survivable leg of the triad. Similarly, delays to the Sentinel program force costly life-extension efforts for the 1970s-era Minuteman III missiles. This demonstrates that the principal threat to the long-term stability of the U.S. deterrent is not an adversary's counterforce capability, but its own internal capacity to execute its ambitious and costly plans on schedule.

Chapter 4: The Russian Federation: A Deterrent Under Strain

Russia's nuclear posture presents a paradox: it possesses the world's largest nuclear stockpile but relies on an increasingly fragile and unreliable delivery infrastructure. This reality severely penalizes its CUS score in the critical domains of Usability and Sustainability, pushing its land-based forces squarely into the MAS paradigm. A significant portion of Russia's strategic throw-weight still resides in its force of aging, liquid-fueled heavy ICBMs, primarily the R-36M2 (SS-18) and UR-100NUTTH (SS-19). These systems are inherently more complex and hazardous than modern solid-fueled missiles. Their corrosive propellants require intensive maintenance, and the fueling process itself presents a significant risk of catastrophic accidents, a danger tragically demonstrated by the Soviet-era Nedelin disaster.

This problem of operational decay is compounded by a critical industrial vulnerability. The design and maintenance expertise for the SS-18's liquid-fuel engines was centered at the Yuzhmash plant in Dnipro, Ukraine. Following the 2014 annexation of Crimea and subsequent full-scale invasion, this vital industrial link was severed, leaving Russia without the original equipment manufacturer's support to sustain its most powerful legacy ICBMs.

The intended replacement, the new liquid-fueled heavy ICBM RS-28 Sarmat, has been plagued by development issues, culminating in multiple, publicly documented test failures. Satellite imagery from September 2024 revealed the complete destruction of a test silo at the Plesetsk Cosmodrome, indicating a catastrophic explosion either during fueling or ignition. These repeated failures suggest a deep-seated loss of institutional knowledge in liquid-fuel rocketry, likely exacerbated by the break with Ukrainian industry. Russia is thus caught in a strategic trap: it cannot reliably maintain its old systems and has proven unable to reliably field their replacements.

This situation places Russia's silo-based deterrent on the verge of a discontinuous failure. Its second-strike assurance is not gracefully degrading but is at risk of a sudden collapse in reliability. For these systems, a launch order carries a non-trivial probability of resulting in a catastrophic explosion within the silo. Such an event would destroy the warhead, prevent a successful launch, and cause massive radiological contamination of Russian territory. This is the very definition of Mutually Assured Self-destruction. While Russia's sea-based leg is modernizing with the Borei-class submarines, the troubled development history of its Bulava SLBM serves as a further reminder of the systemic challenges within its defense-industrial complex.

Chapter 5: The People's Republic of China: The Brittle Superpower

China is engaged in the most significant and rapid expansion of its nuclear arsenal in history, moving from a doctrine of "minimum deterrence" toward becoming a strategic peer of the United States and Russia. The centerpiece of this expansion is the construction of approximately 250 new ICBM silos across three large fields, including sites near Yumen and Hami. This buildup, combined with an expanding force of road-mobile ICBMs, is set to dramatically increase the size and survivability of its land-based forces, which China views as the cornerstone of its deterrent.

However, this impressive land-based expansion masks a critical, strategic flaw: the vulnerability of its sea-based deterrent. A credible second-strike capability, the bedrock of MAD, is best guaranteed by a fleet of stealthy SSBNs capable of disappearing into the ocean depths. China's current fleet of Type 094 (Jin-class) SSBNs fails to meet this standard. Multiple independent assessments, including unclassified reports from the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), characterize the Type 094 as exceptionally noisy and easily detectable, comparable in acoustic signature to Soviet submarines from the 1970s. This vulnerability makes it highly questionable whether a Chinese SSBN could survive transit to a patrol area and remain undetected by the advanced anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities of the United States and its allies. The air-based leg of its nascent triad is even less developed and does not yet pose a credible threat to the continental United States.

This profound imbalance suggests that China's massive silo construction is not an act of strategic confidence, but one of strategic compensation. Aware that its SSBN fleet does not constitute a survivable second-strike force, Beijing is over-investing in hardened, land-based silos. The goal is likely to create a "shell game" with a mix of active and decoy silos, or simply an "absorbent sponge" so numerous that a U.S. first strike could not eliminate all of them, thus guaranteeing some retaliatory capability. This strategy, however, makes China's entire deterrent brittle. It is overwhelmingly reliant on a single leg of the triad, cedes the crucial undersea domain to its adversary, and may create "use-it-or-lose-it" pressures on its silo-based forces during a crisis. This posture falls short of the assured second-strike capability required for a stable MAD relationship.

Chapter 6: The United Kingdom: The Singular Deterrent

The United Kingdom's nuclear deterrent is modern, professional, and highly capable, centered on a posture of Continuous-At-Sea-Deterrence (CASD) that ensures at least one SSBN is on patrol at all times. However, it is structurally the most fragile of the P5 nuclear powers. Its CUS score is crippled by an extreme vulnerability in the Political/Geographic Stability (PGS) sub-index.

The entire British nuclear enterprise is defined by its singularity. It relies on a single weapon system—the Trident II D5 missile, procured from the United States—deployed on a single class of platform, the Vanguard-class SSBN (soon to be replaced by the Dreadnought-class). Most critically, this entire force is dependent on a single operational base: Her Majesty's Naval Base (HMNB) Clyde, which comprises the submarine base at Faslane and the armament depot at Coulport, both located in Scotland. While there are recent policy discussions about adding a dual-capable aircraft capability with the F-35A, this is not yet a mature or operational leg of a triad.

This absolute geographic dependency creates an unparalleled political vulnerability. The Scottish National Party (SNP), the dominant political force in Scotland for over a decade, is institutionally and ideologically committed to the removal of nuclear weapons from Scottish territory. The party's official policy is to make the "speediest safe removal of nuclear weapons" a priority following a vote for independence. This places the future of the UK's deterrent directly in the hands of the Scottish electorate.

Studies by respected institutions like the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) have concluded that relocating the vast, specialized infrastructure from HMNB Clyde would be a monumental undertaking. While technically feasible, it would take more than a decade—likely until the early 2030s, aligning with the entry-into-service of the new Dreadnought submarines—and would cost a minimum of £3–4 billion, not including land acquisition. Furthermore, finding a politically acceptable new location in England or Wales would face immense and predictable local opposition, making the project politically toxic. There is no viable short-term alternative. Consequently, a future vote for Scottish independence would not merely complicate the UK's deterrent; it would present an existential threat to its continued existence, potentially forcing a period of de facto unilateral disarmament while a new home is sought and built. The UK's nuclear deterrent is, in effect, held hostage by the dynamics of Scottish domestic politics.

Chapter 7: The French Republic: The Sovereign European Deterrent

France presents a compelling model of a stable and credible mid-sized nuclear power. Its posture earns a high CUS score, second only to the United States, reflecting a consistent, long-term commitment to a sovereign and modernized deterrent. The French force is structured as a dyad, comprising the sea-based Force Océanique Stratégique (FOST) and the air-based Forces Aériennes Stratégiques (FAS). This structure is built on the principle of "strict sufficiency" (

stricte suffisance), maintaining an arsenal of fewer than 300 warheads, deemed the minimum necessary to inflict "unacceptable damage" on any potential aggressor.

A hallmark of the French deterrent is its fierce independence. France maintains complete sovereign control over the entire lifecycle of its nuclear forces, from the design and manufacture of warheads and missiles to the construction of its SSBNs and Rafale fighter jets and the operation of its independent C2 systems. The President of the Republic is the sole authority for their employment. This autonomy is a core tenet of its strategic doctrine, ensuring its deterrent is not subject to the political decisions of any ally.

Modernization is a continuous and well-funded priority. The sea-based leg, centered on four Triomphant-class SSBNs, is being upgraded with the new M51.3 SLBM. The air-based component is poised for a significant leap in capability with the development of the ASN4G (

Air-Sol Nucléaire de 4e Génération), a hypersonic cruise missile scheduled to enter service by 2035. To support this, France is establishing a new nuclear-capable air base at Luxeuil. The development of hypersonic delivery systems is a clear strategic choice designed to guarantee the ability to penetrate even the most advanced future air defense systems, thereby ensuring the long-term credibility of the deterrent.

In recent years, France has increasingly positioned its deterrent as a key contributor to the security of Europe as a whole. French doctrine has long included a "European dimension" to its "vital interests," and recent presidential statements have invited strategic dialogue with European partners on the role its deterrent plays in continental security. This posture, combined with its robust modernization, enhances France's strategic weight within both NATO and the European Union, offering a potential sovereign European backstop in an era of geopolitical uncertainty.

Part III: Regional Flashpoints and Emerging Doctrines

Chapter 8: The Subcontinent's Self-Destructive Logic (India & Pakistan)

The India-Pakistan dyad is the world's most volatile nuclear flashpoint and the clearest real-world example of the Mutually Assured Self-destruction (MAS) paradigm. The relationship is defined by doctrinal asymmetry, a history of conventional conflict under the nuclear umbrella, and an increasing vulnerability to non-military shocks, particularly climate change.

India officially adheres to a "No First Use" (NFU) policy, reserving the right of massive retaliation to any first strike against it. In contrast, Pakistan maintains a policy of "full spectrum deterrence," deliberately retaining the option of a first use of nuclear weapons, including tactical nuclear weapons, to offset India's significant conventional military superiority. This doctrinal clash creates a deeply unstable dynamic where any conventional conflict carries the inherent risk of nuclear escalation.

This dynamic is a textbook illustration of the "stability-instability paradox": the presence of nuclear weapons has likely prevented a full-scale conventional war, but it has simultaneously enabled a state of persistent, low-level conflict. This includes state-sponsored terrorism, border skirmishes, and limited military strikes, as seen in the 1999 Kargil War and, more recently, the May 2025 conflict. The 2025 crisis was particularly alarming, as it involved missile strikes deep into each other's territory, with some attacks landing dangerously close to sensitive military and nuclear command and control installations.

Compounding this military instability is the growing threat of climate change. Both nations are highly vulnerable to climate-induced disasters, with water scarcity being a primary concern. The Indus River system is a shared lifeline, and disputes over water management are a potent source of tension. Political rhetoric in both countries has explicitly linked the potential for a "water war" to military conflict, with Pakistani officials warning that any attempt by India to cut off water supplies could be met with a full-spectrum response, including nuclear weapons. A regional nuclear exchange would have devastating global consequences, with climate modeling predicting that the atmospheric soot from burning cities could cause a sharp drop in global temperatures and trigger widespread crop failures, leading to a global famine.

For India and Pakistan, nuclear weapons do not create a stable peace; they enable a dangerous state of perpetual brinkmanship. Climate change is poised to become a primary trigger for the next major crisis. Unlike a terrorist attack, a severe drought or a dispute over dam flows represents a slow-burning, existential threat that could provoke more desperate and less calculated decision-making. This could easily initiate an escalatory cycle that conventional forces cannot contain and where nuclear use would be utterly self-destructive for both societies, regardless of which side "won" the initial exchange.

Chapter 9: De-Facto and Aspiring Nuclear States

Beyond the established P5 powers, a second tier of nuclear actors adds further complexity and instability to the global strategic landscape.

• Israel: Israel maintains a long-standing policy of "nuclear ambiguity" (amimut), neither confirming nor denying the existence of its arsenal. It is widely believed to possess a sophisticated triad of delivery systems, including nuclear-capable aircraft, the Jericho series of ballistic missiles, and submarine-launched cruise missiles deployed on its Dolphin-class submarines. This provides a robust and survivable second-strike capability, ensuring its deterrent credibility under the "Samson Option" doctrine. Due to its opacity, its CUS score can only be estimated, but its Usability and Sustainability are assumed to be high.

• North Korea (DPRK): The DPRK is rapidly expanding and diversifying its nuclear forces, having declared its status as a nuclear-weapon state to be "irreversible" in its constitution. It has conducted numerous tests of various ballistic missiles, including ICBMs capable of reaching the United States. Its modernization efforts are focused on developing more survivable delivery systems, such as solid-fuel ICBMs, submarine-launched missiles, and even novel platforms like nuclear-capable destroyers. Despite its growing Capability, North Korea's CUS score remains low due to the extreme constraints on its isolated economy (low Industrial Sustainment) and the presumed vulnerabilities of its C2 systems.

• Iran: Iran stands as a critical nuclear threshold state. Reports from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in mid-2025 confirm that Tehran has amassed a significant stockpile of uranium enriched to 60%, a level very close to weapons-grade. This gives Iran the technical capacity for a rapid "breakout"—the ability to produce enough fissile material for several nuclear weapons in a matter of weeks or even days. Critically, the IAEA's ability to monitor Iran's activities has been severely curtailed, with inspectors removed and surveillance equipment disconnected. This "loss of continuity of knowledge" means the international community can no longer provide assurance about the peaceful nature of Iran's program, creating significant uncertainty and strategic instability. While its current CUS score is low, its potential Capability score is high and rising.

Chapter 10: The "Unusable if Stolen" Doctrine: A Verification Protocol for Myanmar

The scenario of a non-nuclear state, such as a military junta in Myanmar, falsely claiming to have acquired a nuclear weapon (e.g., through theft or illicit purchase) poses a unique challenge. Such a claim seeks to gain deterrent value through ambiguity, forcing the international community into the difficult position of proving a negative—a classic "devil's proof." The "Unusable if Stolen" doctrine offers a policy framework to counter this by shifting the focus from the weapon itself to the vast and observable infrastructure required to make it usable. A nuclear warhead, isolated from its complex support ecosystem, is a radiologically hazardous but strategically inert object.

This doctrine can be operationalized through a verifiable, OSINT-based checklist focused on tracking these essential "enablers."

OSINT Verification Checklist ("The Enabler Trace"):

1. Specialized Transport and Handling: A nuclear warhead is heavy, sensitive, and requires specialized vehicles for safe and secure transport. OSINT analysis would task commercial satellite constellations (optical and Synthetic Aperture Radar) to monitor key military logistics hubs, ports, and airfields for the presence of unique, climate-controlled, high-security transport vehicles and heavy-lift cranes. Publicly available Automatic Identification System (AIS) and Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast (ADS-B) data would be scoured for anomalies, such as military-escorted convoys or high-security cargo flights with unusual flight paths. The absence of such observable activity would be a primary indicator against a credible claim.

2. Fueling and Preparation Infrastructure: Delivery systems require specific propellants. For a liquid-fueled missile, this would involve a complex chain of chemical precursors, manufacturing plants, and specialized tanker trucks, all of which have distinct thermal and physical signatures detectable by satellite. For a gravity bomb, specialized weapon-handling bays and loading equipment at an airbase would be required. Monitoring the industrial and logistical chain for these components provides another layer of verification.

3. Launch Platform Integration and Training: A warhead requires a compatible and tested delivery vehicle. OSINT would verify if the claimant state possesses aircraft or missiles capable of carrying the specific weapon type. These platforms would be monitored for any modifications, specialized maintenance activity, or training exercises (e.g., through analysis of NOTAMs/航行警報) indicative of a new nuclear mission.

4. Command, Control, and Communications (C2): A credible nuclear force requires a redundant and hardened C2 system to ensure authorized use. Analysis would search for the construction of new underground command bunkers, the deployment of unique communication arrays (e.g., VLF/ELF for submarine communication), or unusual, encrypted communication patterns consistent with a nuclear command chain.

5. Specialized Personnel: Operating and maintaining a nuclear weapon requires a team of highly trained physicists and engineers. Human intelligence (HUMINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) proxies would be used to track the movement of any known foreign nuclear experts or the establishment of new, high-security scientific cadres within the country.

This OSINT-driven assessment would form the basis of a coordinated diplomatic protocol. Instead of demanding the impossible proof of absence, an international coalition (e.g., via the UN Security Council or an ad-hoc "Execution Coalition") would publicly present the evidence, stating: "We have monitored for the necessary enablers of a usable nuclear weapon and have detected none. Therefore, your claim is not credible." This approach denies the claimant the strategic ambiguity they seek, reframes the crisis around verifiable facts, and provides a clear, evidence-based foundation for international action.

Part IV: Synthesis and Strategic Implications

Chapter 11: The New Map of Deterrence: MAS/MAD Heatmap Analysis

The synthesis of the country-specific CUS Index assessments reveals a global strategic landscape that is increasingly fragmented and unstable. The classic bipolar MAD model of the Cold War no longer applies universally. The following dyad matrix visualizes this new reality, color-coding the stability of key nuclear pairings based on their proximity to a stable MAD relationship or a volatile MAS condition.

Table 2: MAS/MAD Dyad Matrix 2025

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Color Key:

• Green (Stable MAD): Both sides possess highly survivable, reliable second-strike forces and robust C2. Deterrence is stable.

• Yellow (Unstable MAD): One or both sides have significant vulnerabilities that could erode second-strike confidence in a crisis, leading to miscalculation.

• Red (Volatile MAS): Critical vulnerabilities in reliability, survivability, or a dangerously low conflict threshold mean that nuclear use is potentially self-destructive or that escalation is difficult to control.

Chapter 12: The Physics of Failure: Radiological Dispersal Scenarios

A core element of the MAS paradigm, particularly concerning Russia's aging liquid-fueled ICBMs, is the risk of launch failure. It is critical to accurately characterize the consequences of such an event to avoid miscalculation and panic. A catastrophic explosion on the launch pad or during the boost phase would be a localized disaster, not a nuclear detonation.

Modern nuclear warheads are engineered with multiple, redundant safety and security features to make an accidental nuclear yield a statistical impossibility. Key among these are:

• Permissive Action Links (PALs): Electromechanical or electronic locks that require a specific code to be entered to arm the warhead. Without this code, the firing sequence cannot be completed.

• One-Point Safety: The high-explosive charges surrounding the plutonium pit are designed so that if they are detonated at a single point—as would likely happen in a fire or explosion—the resulting compression is asymmetrical and will not trigger a nuclear chain reaction.

• Environmental Sensing Devices (ESDs): These sensors ensure a warhead can only be armed after it has experienced the correct sequence of environmental cues associated with a normal launch and flight (e.g., high acceleration, zero gravity, atmospheric reentry).

Given these safeguards, the primary hazard from an ICBM launch failure is not nuclear yield but the violent dispersal of the weapon's fissile material, primarily plutonium-239. The explosion of tons of rocket propellant would pulverize the plutonium pit into fine particles, creating a radioactive aerosol.

Using standard atmospheric transport and dispersion models (such as the HYSPLIT model developed by NOAA), it is possible to project the contamination footprint from such an event. A hypothetical failure at a known Russian ICBM field like Plesetsk, using prevailing wind patterns, would likely result in a plume of plutonium particles drifting hundreds of kilometers downwind. This would create a significant and long-lasting radiological hazard, contaminating vast swaths of land, rendering agriculture impossible, and requiring a massive, multi-decade cleanup effort. The consequences would be severe, akin to a major radiological incident like Chernobyl, but it would remain a contamination event, not a nuclear explosion. Understanding this distinction is crucial for crisis management and de-escalation.

Chapter 13: Policy Recommendations for the Post-Walpurgis Environment

The transition from a stable MAD world to a fragmented landscape of MAD and MAS requires a fundamental shift in strategic assessment and policy. The following recommendations are designed to enhance stability and manage risk in this new era.

1. Adopt the CUS Index as a Standard for Net Assessment: National security assessments should formally adopt the Capability-Usability-Sustainability framework. This will shift the focus of analysis from misleading metrics like raw warhead counts to the operational realities of reliability, survivability, and political stability. This provides a more accurate picture of an adversary's true capabilities and vulnerabilities.

2. Reframe Strategic Dialogue Around the MAS Concept: The "MAD to MAS" lexicon should be used in strategic stability dialogues with both allies and adversaries.

   • With Allies: It provides a clear rationale for the high costs of modernization (e.g., for the US and UK), framing it not as arms racing but as essential maintenance to prevent a slide into an unstable MAS posture.

   • With Adversaries (Russia/China): It introduces a shared interest in avoiding MAS. Highlighting the dangers of relying on brittle or unreliable systems (e.g., Russian liquid-fueled ICBMs, Chinese SSBNs) can create common ground for discussions on transparency, risk reduction, and avoiding destabilizing postures.

3. Implement "Enabler-Focused" Counter-Proliferation: For emerging threats and rogue actors, policy should pivot to the "Unusable if Stolen" doctrine. This involves:

   • Targeted Sanctions and Interdiction: Focus export controls and maritime interdiction efforts on the specific "enablers" identified in Chapter 10—specialized transport, propellant chemicals, and unique handling equipment.

   • OSINT-Based Diplomacy: Leverage verifiable, open-source intelligence to publicly debunk false claims of nuclear capability, denying rogue states the strategic ambiguity they seek.

4. Prioritize Climate Stability as Nuclear Stability in South Asia: For the India-Pakistan dyad, where the MAS risk is highest, policy must recognize that environmental stress is now a primary escalation driver. The international community should:

   • Invest heavily in regional climate resilience and water management initiatives, particularly concerning the Indus Basin.

   • Frame cooperation on water security not as an environmental issue, but as a critical nuclear confidence-building measure to prevent a climate-induced conflict from spiraling into a nuclear exchange.

5. Develop and Disseminate a Coherent Communication Strategy: Utilize the concepts in this report to build a clear public and diplomatic narrative (per Appendix C). The key messages should be:

   • MAD to MAS Shift: Explain that the nature of nuclear risk is changing from intentional, large-scale war to accidental escalation stemming from unreliable systems and regional instability.

   • Reliability Over Numbers: Emphasize that modern deterrence is about the usability and survivability of forces, not just their size.

   • Verification Through OSINT: Promote the "Unusable if Stolen" doctrine as a new, verifiable standard for non-proliferation that avoids the "devil's proof" dilemma. This comprehensive approach will better equip policymakers to navigate the complex and increasingly perilous nuclear landscape of the 21st century.

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